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A common payroll for United Nations system organizations

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the General Assembly the report of the Joint Inspection Unit entitled "A common payroll for United Nations system organizations" (JIU/REP/2005/4).

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A COMMON PAYROLL FOR UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM ORGANIZATIONS

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ACRONYMS

CEB	United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (formerly ACC)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
HLCM	High-level Committee on Management (of CEB)
HLCP	High-level Committee on Programmes (of CEB)
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICC	International Computing Centre
ICSC	International Civil Service Commission
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UPU	Universal Postal Union
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WTO	World Tourism Organization

GLOSSARY

Enterprise resource planning

Enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems are software packages composed of several modules, such as human resources, sales, finance and production, providing cross-organization integration of data through embedded business processes. These software packages can be customized to cater to the specific needs of an organization. During the 1990s, ERP systems became the de facto standard for replacement of legacy systems in large, and particularly in multinational, companies.[1]

In-sourcing

In this report, the term "in-sourcing" has been used to differentiate between external (to the United Nations system) outsourcing and internal outsourcing. In this report, in-sourcing is used to refer to the provision of services by organizations belonging to and within the United Nations system.

Offshoring

Offshoring means relocating non-core activities to low-cost areas while maintaining the activity within the organization. Back-office and support functions, such as payroll processing, helpdesks, staff records data entry, etc., are performed by the organization's own staff but in areas where operating costs are significantly lower than the average for the organization.

Outsourcing

Outsourcing means to seek resources outside an organizational structure, usually to save money and/or exploit the skills of another entity. Typically used in the business world, outsourcing often entails an enterprise using another company, such as a consultancy or application service provider, to provide a service that the enterprise can provide for itself, when it is cheaper to utilize a third-party's resources. For example, an enterprise might outsource its information technology (IT) management because it is cheaper to contract a third-party to do so than it would be to build its own in-house IT management team. In this report the term "outsourcing" is used to refer to services provided by entities external to the United Nations system.[2]

Payroll, payroll system and payroll processing system

Payroll is a list of employees receiving regular pay.[3] Although no formal definition could be found for "payroll system" the association of both terms (payroll and system) suggests a method or procedure by which the employees of an organization are paid. It includes a defined set of interdependent items and rules that stipulate the pay conditions of a given organization, such as salary structure, tax schedules, benefits and allowances, frequency and pay dates, etc. A payroll processing system can be defined as a computer system used by an organization to process and pay the wages of employees. It is to be noted that the terms "payroll system" and "payroll processing system" are often used indistinctly to refer to a computer system which processes payroll.

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[1] "A model of ERP project implementation", Parr A., and Shanks G., Journal of Information Technology, 2000.
[2] See www.webopedia.com.
[3] The Concise Oxford Dictionary, tenth edition.

Executive summary

Objective: This report addresses significant financial savings that would accrue to United Nations organizations and to Member States should they agree on establishing a common payroll. The investments made by these organizations in management information systems (MIS) alone exceeded US$ 1 billion over the past ten years.[4] A different common approach coordinating investment efforts in a system-wide manner would have represented considerable savings and additional benefits. This report examines payroll service delivery in different organizations in order to detect major obstacles and to develop recommendations for future improvement of payroll systems and processes. The analysis and recommendations are intended to provide a starting point for a future cost effective solution for payroll delivery across United Nations organizations.

Conclusions and recommendations

A. Most of the organizations, funds and programmes have developed their own MIS in recent years. The Integrated Management Information System (IMIS) cost over US$ 80 million, ILO's Integrated Resource Information System (IRIS) system cost some US$ 40 million and WHO has signed a contract with Oracle Corporation at a cost of US$ 55 million and on and on it goes with Member States footing huge bills for the same services. As part of these solutions, organizations have developed their own payroll solutions, which have evolved independently over the years. The United Nations system operates today about 17 different payroll-processing systems. The current payroll service delivery environment is the product of an uncoordinated approach, heavily influenced by organization-unique interpretation of common rules and regulations. The different interpretations of common rules and regulations have contributed to complex sets of requirements that, when taken together, unduly complicate payroll administration and modernization. However, a coordinated approach to future development, the harmonization and standardization of rules and regulations, i.e., their common interpretation, and the commitment of senior management can overcome these barriers. The Inspectors would like to stress the need for upfront inter-agency leadership commitment and support. This should be done through a specific governance mechanism yet to be established; without a doubt, it is the most important success factor to push the implementation of any common system solution through the barriers created by bureaucracy.

B. The approach to be taken should be carefully planned on an inter-organizational basis, given the important investments already made in MIS. The Inspectors believe that the first step towards a common payroll system would be the reduction in the number of current payroll systems. "Leader" organizations should be established for each of the current vendor groups as well as for other existing systems, such as IMIS. These leader organizations and/or common service entities, such as the International Computing Centre (ICC), could offer payroll services to those organizations interested in their specific solutions.

C. A preliminary analysis of the savings to be expected for a common payroll system shows savings in the range of US$ 100 million over a period of 10 years and this is just "the tip of the iceberg" given the additional significant benefits to be expected, which are difficult to quantify at this stage. Investment in payroll systems could provide significant returns in cost avoidance and in better system management. Major benefits include:

- elimination of redundant systems and processes (simplification and consolidation);
- internal efficiencies and effectiveness;
- cost reductions;
- enabling agencies to focus on their core mission;
- enhancing standardization, an opportunity to streamline payroll policies and procedures.

D. The Inspectors believe that a common payroll system is not only technically feasible but also financially desirable, though it is not a simple task. To make it happen, the leadership commitment and the support of senior system-wide management are crucial success factors. The issue of inter-agency leadership support and

[4] See JIU/REP/2002/9.

commitment has been strongly emphasized in the comments received from all organizations; without it, there are no possibilities of succeeding in the implementation of any common solution. While this initiative should have been considered 10 years ago, it is not too late to move forward now.

Recommendation 1

The General Assembly should:

(a) Endorse the development of a common payroll system as the first step towards a common ERP for the United Nations system as a whole; and

(b) Request the Secretary-General, in his capacity as Chairman of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB): to seek the highest-level commitment from the United Nations system organizations, by setting up a governance structure, which should speed up, coordinate and oversee the development and implementation of a common payroll system through the implementation of a phased approach and within the context of a common ERP system; and to report back to the General Assembly on the implementation status of this recommendation at its sixty-second session.

(*For details, see* ***paras. 12-16 for (a) and (b), and paras. 30 and 31 for (b).***)

Recommendation 2

The Secretary-General, in his capacity as Chairman of CEB, should invite CEB to:

(a) Establish "leader" organizations or common service entities, which can provide payroll services, on a fee or other financial basis, to those agencies that have old and antiquated systems;

(b) Harmonize, simplify and standardize the application across the United Nations system of the common staff rules and regulations relating to payroll and allowances; and,

(c) Report back to the General Assembly on the implementation status of this recommendation at its sixty-second session.

(*For details, see* ***para. 16 for (a) and paras. 35-37 for (b).***)

INTRODUCTION

1. The payroll function is not a mission-critical activity for the United Nations system, although the sensitivity of timely and accurate payroll results makes it a high-visibility function. Payroll processing lends itself to opportunities for public-private partnerships and outsourcing options that would provide better value for the United Nations system and allow resources to be better focused on mission delivery. The outsourcing of payroll processing could be either internal - within the United Nations system - where some organizations would act as service providers for others, or external in which some private or public service providers would deliver payroll processing services.

2. In the last decade a considerable number of private-sector organizations as well as some public-sector ones have looked into different ways to optimize scarce resources by concentrating on their core missions and outsourcing or "offshoring" those non-critical activities, in particular administrative ones such as payroll processing, data entry, etc. The offshoring alternative was recognized in a wide sense in a background paper prepared by the ICT (information and communications technologies) Networking Group of the High-level Committee on Management (HLCM).[5] The advantages identified were: reduced service costs, organizations could concentrate on core activities and the United Nations would be setting an example and providing support to the economies of developing countries and countries in transition. This offshoring initiative might also serve as a pilot study and useful benchmark for further similar arrangements for a wide range of administrative activities.

3. Regarding the possibility of external outsourcing, it should be noted that many United Nations organizations operate non-standard systems that have been developed internally. Current application external service providers rarely take over non standard, non commercial systems, and, therefore, at this stage it would not be a cost-effective solution. Several organizations have looked into this possibility and concluded that it is not a viable alternative. The Inspectors share this view.

4. The most critical factor for the success of a common payroll system is the leadership commitment and the support from senior management. The role of CEB and its HLCM, are crucial elements for the success of this initiative. The ICT Network of CEB has already developed a United Nations system ICT strategic framework that has been endorsed by High-level Committee on Programmes (HLCP), HLCM and CEB during its eighth session on 5 and 6 October 2004 (CEB/2004/6). HLCM, in its April 2005 meeting, requested the establishment of a Working Group comprising members of HLCM, HLCP and the ICT network to take forward the United Nations ICT strategy initiatives. Business cases are being developed for, inter alia, payroll by the ICC. The General Assembly is expected to take up the ICT strategy at its sixtieth session. This report shares the main areas of concern of ICT strategy, in particular, the need to implement common software applications, such as payroll, in the context of a desirable common enterprise resource planning (ERP) system for the whole United Nations system.

5. In the approach to a future ERP common to the whole United Nations system, payroll application could be used as the first pilot project of a common application. The reasons for this are: (a) it is not a mission-critical activity; (b) estimated savings are considerable; (c) work has already begun in this respect in the context of the ICT strategy development; and (d) there are some agencies already interested in finding a solution to this particular issue.

6. The Inspectors would like to thank the officials from the different United Nations organizations who took the time to provide data through interviews and questionnaires, as well as the different United States federal agencies that shared their experience in consolidating payroll operations within the United States Government. The Inspectors want also to express their gratitude to the International Computing Centre (ICC), software vendors, and others who provided valuable views for the preparation of this report.

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[5] United Nations System ICT Strategy, background document to the report of the ICT Network Working Group, September 2004.

I. TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY

7. The table below (see annex) shows the different types of payroll systems in use within various organizations, funds and programmes. There is considerable disparity among the solutions and vendors chosen by the organizations, ranging from in-house developments to commercial products customized to meet the specific needs of a given organization. All of them are at different stages of information systems development.

8. Although this study is focused on payroll processing systems, payroll should not be seen as an isolated software application, as it heavily interfaces with human resources management systems (HRMS) and financial information systems. Many of the projects to introduce MIS have been based on the introduction of ERP systems, thus the introduction of a common payroll system should be carefully planned in the wider context of an ERP.

9. In some cases, the payroll application is part, or a module, of a wider scope system, such as an ERP, which might have been supplied by just one vendor. In other cases, it is part of an HRMS, which interfaces with financial systems supplied by different vendors, resulting in the development of customized interfaces between the different systems. In the most complex cases, the payroll application is software developed internally by a given organization, which interfaces with financial and human resources systems and databases that are non-standard, in-house developments.

10. The major ERP vendors in the marketplace are Oracle, PeopleSoft[6] and SAP, and all of them are present within the United Nations family. Additionally, use is made of a custom solution, IMIS, developed by the Secretariat.

11. The Inspectors held meetings with representatives of major ERP system vendors to ascertain the technical feasibility of a common payroll for the United Nations system. All of them concluded, with firm conviction that current technology allows for a common payroll system, that: (a) different systems can "talk" to each other, either through the use in some cases of standard interfaces or through the development of new ones; and (b) the payroll applications proposed by each of these major vendors can run on top of different operating systems, including different versions of Unix (i.e. Linux, Solaris, etc), which are the base of open-source software solutions. In addition, senior management and IT experts within the system confirmed this can be done overturning middle management's mantra that it cannot be done and "we are different".

[6] PeopleSoft has been taken over by Oracle Corporation.

II. TIME FRAME

12. The time frame for implementation of a common payroll system is heavily influenced by the fact that each organization is in a different phase of information systems development. Some of the organizations have just launched new payroll systems or plan to go live during 2005 (United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), International Labour Organization (ILO) and Universal Postal Union (UPU)), others have just finished their vendor selection process (World Health Organization (WHO), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)), while others are in an operational phase after years of development (the United Nations Secretariat launched its IMIS Release IV, which is mainly payroll, in 2000). In addition other organizations are operating old payroll systems, considered obsolete, and are planning to renew their systems in the short term (International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and World Meteorological Organization (WMO)). The non-coordinated evolution and the current status of implementation within the different organizations calls for a carefully planned, phased approach.

13. The investments already made are considerable and should be taken into consideration, maximizing their return-on-investment, when planning the time frame of a future convergence. The United Nations system's investment in ICT is growing at a faster rate than the operating budgets of most United Nations organizations, or than worldwide inflation.[7] Investments in MIS alone exceeded US$ 1 billion over the past 10 years.[8] The average life cycle of a MIS is in the range of 10 years.

14. The Inspectors believe that planning should start now on an inter-organizational basis if a common payroll system is to succeed in the mid- to long-term. In addition, the fast evolution of IT may facilitate the consolidation of information systems as a whole. Next-generation systems might represent an opportunity for a single system-wide information system, i.e., a single ERP.

15. Needless to say, the approach indicated above towards the implementation of a common payroll system can be applied, in the context of wider-scope ERP systems, to other software applications (staff records data entry, e-recruitment, finance applications, etc.), given the fact that there is a significant commonality of business processes among the United Nations system organizations. A major opportunity exists to leverage the investments already made, and to minimize those that will continue to be made.

16. The Inspectors' conclusion is that this project could be a reality in the medium to long term (5 to 10 years) if the decision is taken now. A phased approach would include the following stages:

- **Phase 1**: Consolidation of current payroll systems into several groups of leading organizations or common service entities, acting as payroll service providers (internal to the United Nations system). This phase can be accomplished in the short term (1 to 4 years). It is proposed to create leader organizations for each of the different major payroll systems already available within the United Nations, such as Oracle, PeopleSoft, SAP and IMIS;
- **Phase 2**: Consolidation into a common payroll system, at the end of which only one or two organizations would provide payroll services for the whole United Nations system. The decision to use one or two service providers should be taken after a preliminary risk analysis. The Inspectors are of the view that two service providers should be used in order to reduce risks. This phase could be a reality in the medium term (4-7 years);
- **Phase 3**: Common ERP for the United Nations system. Taking into consideration the technical complexity of the issue and the need to fully amortize current investments, the Inspectors believe that this could only be achieved in the long term (7 to 10 years) if the decision is taken now.

(*See **Recommendations 1 (a) and 1 (b)** above.*)

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[7] United Nations System ICT Strategy, background document to the report of the ICT Network Working Group, September 2004.
[8] See JIU/REP/2002/9.

III. SAVINGS AND BENEFITS

17. It is difficult to quantify additional, and not negligible, system-wide savings emanating from avoidance of future investments in acquisition and/or maintenance of new systems by those organizations that might decide to in-source their payroll processing to one of the "leading organizations". As well, there are benefits arising from the standardization of systems that are of a more qualitative nature and thus difficult to quantify.

A. Savings

18. The Inspectors prepared a savings analysis, which is based on the cost per payslip currently borne by the different United Nations system organizations, compared with benchmark organizations.[9] The collection of data necessary to estimate savings has been difficult as some organizations did not know the cost of their payroll systems. In some cases the systems are so old that it is difficult to estimate what the initial acquisition or development costs were, related to payroll processing. In other cases the data provided by the different organizations was inconsistent or not complete. The costs taken into consideration were: payroll-related hardware and software acquisition and development costs (in order to come up with a "cost per payslip per year", acquisition and development costs have been distributed over a 10-year period), annual hardware and annual software maintenance and/or annual license fees. Other costs, which might represent additional marginal savings, such as office space and electricity, have not been taken into consideration given the preliminary nature of this report.

19. Our estimate of savings emanating from a common approach to payroll delivery is in the range of US$ 100 million over 10 years. This is not a negligible amount. The analysis of data provided by organizations leads us to estimate that the average payroll cost per employee per year currently borne by the United Nations system organizations is in the range of US$ 200 – 250. The assumption that the efficiencies obtained by having fewer systems would place the cost for the United Nations closer to that borne by benchmark organizations - in the range of US$ 100 per employee per year - implies that average savings of US$ 125 per employee per year could be achieved. This amount, applied to the total United Nations system staff (about 80,000 including all types of contracts) over a period of 10 years, leads to our initial broad estimate of the savings that can be achieved. There are considerable additional hidden savings and benefits that make the Inspectors believe that the amount of savings estimated is just the "tip of the iceberg".

20. Organizations planning to purchase a new payroll system have now a choice, either to buy a new one or to in-source payroll delivery using one of the United Nations organizations as a payroll service provider; in both cases there is an upfront investment. It is obvious that if a given organization opts for in-sourcing, there will be an initial cost associated for the adaptation of the chosen payroll service provider system to the needs of the client organization. This cost is difficult to quantify at this stage. Implementation costs are very difficult to estimate, as they represent the cost to adapt standard products to the specific client's environment and needs. Thus, an individual preliminary study would be required for each case in order to provide realistic figures. In addition to the initial investment required to customize the service provider's payroll system to meet the client organization's needs, there are other operating costs associated to the provision of the service. These should be included under a contractual agreement between the organizations, indicating the agreed level of service and the financial commitments for both parties (fees, cost recovery mechanisms or other financial arrangements).

21. The ERP vendors interviewed indicated that the upfront investment to be made by a small organization (200-300 employees) purchasing a new system might be in the range of US$ 1 million. The

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[9] According to Atlanta-based benchmarking services provider The Hackett Group, best-practice companies in the Fortune 1000 spend $85 per employee per year on payroll, others spend as much as $715. The U.S. Government's target is to reduce these costs from the current average of $120 per employee per year down to $97.

Inspectors believe that, for a small organization, the acquisition cost of a payroll system may be higher than the cost associated to the adaptation of one of the existing systems. Nevertheless, savings should not be seen from an individual organization point of view but from a system-wide perspective. As an example, the case of an organization purchasing a new system can be considered. The price of a new system might be similar in the worst scenario to the cost of adaptation of an existing system but there are additional savings to be considered from a system-wide perspective, such as those emanating from the avoidance of duplicated maintenance and software upgrades. These costs could be shared by the payroll service provider and the client organization if just one system is used, while if there are two different systems both organizations would bear separate maintenance and software upgrading costs.

B. Qualitative and non-quantifiable benefits

22. The benefits of consolidating payroll processing, initially around three or four major leading organizations or common service entities that might act as service providers for the others, are multiple:

- The use of market standards would facilitate and reduce the cost of future global system integration. Once the final consolidation of systems is achieved, the outsourcing alternative could then be considered, although the Inspectors believe that a detailed risk analysis of this alternative should be undertaken in advance;
- Current investments would be optimized and the cost of redundant systems would be avoided;
- New upfront investments would be avoided for those organizations not having made a decision;
- Leading organizations or common service entities, acting as service providers, could generate additional resources and share costs (e.g. maintenance, support and upgrade costs);
- With reduced costs and increased efficiency overall, as an example, systems software upgrades would be done in fewer locations.

23. The United States Government has implemented a similar project, although much bigger in size. The scope of the project is focused on the approximately 1.8 million executive-branch employees. In the recent past, there were some 26 different federal agencies running their own payroll systems. The nature and size of the different agencies is quite diverse (the smallest having only three staff and the biggest having about 225,000 employees). There were no common guidelines and most of the payroll systems were in-house developments and not interconnected. The number of payroll systems and providers has now officially been reduced to four. Some agencies have not yet finished the migration of payroll operations and still run their own system. Ultimately, the total number of employees to be paid through the use of the four systems is 1.8 million and the number of different pay plans is about 190. The American officials interviewed indicated that the implementation of a common payroll system for the United Nations system might be easier than theirs, given the fact that the total number of employees is considerably lower (about 80,000) and that there is only one common salary scale for professionals and fewer pay plans across the system.

24. Upon completion of migrations, only the four agencies currently operating payroll systems in the United States government will be payroll service providers for the client agencies and a mandatory contract between the service provider and the client agency defines the agreed level of service. Employees are paid biweekly and agencies pay on average US$ 120 per employee per year to the payroll service provider. The goal is to further reduce it (target: US$ 97). The expected savings on an aggregate basis are US$ 1.2 billion over 10 years, although it was admitted that the cost-analysis part was not an easy one. It took one year to obtain data via a benchmarking study from the agencies. Not all the agencies contacted responded to the study.

IV. STRATEGY AND GOVERNANCE

25. In March 2003 the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, as Chairman of CEB, to develop a comprehensive ICT strategy for the United Nations system.[10] This was in recognition of the fact that a system-wide strategic vision for ICT had never been formulated.

26. The ICT Network (ICT directors of the entities of the United Nations system), in close collaboration with the ICT Task Force, developed a proposal on a system-wide ICT strategy. The two high-level committees of CEB, HLCP and HLCM, "reviewed the United Nations ICT strategy document at their sessions in the fall of 2004. HLCP welcomed the main thrust of the strategy. HLCM, to which the ICT Network reports, endorsed the strategy in general, and agreed that future work should focus on measures to address the governance and organizational constraints on the development of the business cases and on proposals for a prioritized and coordinated implementation plan. The Committee also requested that the business case for the strategy be further developed, including resource implications, to enable HLCM to decide on the next steps for implementing a United Nations system-wide ICT strategy".[11] In April 2005, the HLCM endorsed eight priority areas for business case development of which common application solution was one.

27. A Strategy Charter has been developed. This Charter provides a framework for a systematic approach to the management of technological and organizational change, and a coordinated approach to planning, implementation and maintenance of technology-based initiatives, recognizing the role of ICT, inter alia, in: (a) maximizing the return on investments in ERPs by developing best-practice procedures for common United Nations processes, and seeking streamlining and efficiency savings across common administrative processes; and (b) promoting opportunities for sharing computer applications across agencies in areas where United Nations requirements are common, or close to common.

28. The Inspectors believe that the strategy developed is a sound starting point. In addition, they share, inter alia, the two major areas of concern for the implementation of a common payroll system, in particular, maximizing the return on investment in ERPs and promoting opportunities for sharing computer applications across agencies. The existence of a strategy is already a very positive step forward but it is just the beginning. The interviews held during the preparation of this report confirmed that the actual level of coordination and information shared by the United Nations system organizations is still low, with significant room for improvement. The Inspectors believe that now is the time for action. Developing the way ahead and assigning responsibilities in view of the savings and benefits calls for "an unprecedented degree of cooperation amongst Agencies on ICT matters".[12]

29. In the context of the ICT Network, it is important to note that, further to a decision of its governing body (Management Committee), the International Computing Centre is pursuing the following five ICT initiatives: common payroll system; global messaging system; United Nations ICT training; ICT services sourcing strategy; and information security, disaster recovery and business continuity. ICC has initiated feasibility studies for each of the above initiatives, which, as shared services, have a very high potential for savings through economies of scale and skills. ICC is actively working on these initiatives with its own resources but also with the help of consultants and the active participation of a number of United Nations organizations. Starting in September 2005, ICC will initiate pilots with interested parties and will report its findings at its next Management Committee meeting, scheduled for October 2005.

30. The leadership support is crucial, as well as the required governance structure, given the fact that the different entities of the United Nations system represented at CEB operate rather independently and report to different legislative bodies, which in turn establish and approve their programmes of work and allocate their

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[10] See General Assembly resolution 57/295 of 20 December 2002.
[11] A/59/563, para. 13.
[12] Report of the ICT Network Working Group, September 2004.

funding. "In reality, the United Nations system operates as a loose conglomerate of federated entities with varying levels of coordination but without a direct line of command to its Chief Executive".[13]

31. The Inspectors believe that a governance structure should be established, under the auspices of the CEB, including senior representatives from the organizations, funds and programmes in the areas of human resources management (HRM), finance and IT, as well as from the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC), taking into consideration the current HRM reforms. The responsibility of this governance structure would be to speed up, coordinate and oversee the development and implementation of the common payroll system through a phased approach and within the context of a common ERP system.

*(See **Recommendation 1 (b)**)*

32. The consolidation of multiple current payroll systems, as a first step, into fewer systems based on the current major vendors present within the United Nations system (Oracle, PeopleSoft and SAP) and IMIS or other potential providers, such as a common services entity (ICC, etc.), is an important leap into possible final system integration. The benefits of such an approach have already been indicated. Some organizations have expressed their concerns about confidentiality issues regarding the provision of payroll-processing services by another United Nations system organization. This should not be a problem; to outsource payroll services is a common practice in the private sector, more sensitive to confidentiality issues than the United Nations system where salary scales are public. Additionally, vendors interviewed indicated that confidentiality could be maintained through the application of current technology. Finally, specific requirements in this respect should be dealt with in the context of the technical working groups to be established and regulated through a mandatory contract or memorandum of understanding between the client organization and the selected payroll service provider.

*(See **Recommendation 2 (a)**)*

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[13] Ibid.

V. STRENGTHENING UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM COOPERATION

33. The Inspectors believe that to facilitate the implementation of a common payroll system, in fact to facilitate the use of system-wide common software applications of any type, it is necessary to create a set of data element standards to be shared by payroll and human resources (HR) systems on a system-wide basis. This data set should include, inter alia, a staff member profile common to all United Nations organizations. This implies the creation of a central, common system-wide database or the use of decentralized but interconnected standard databases. This element would have a significant impact in facilitating the use of common applications in all areas, (i.e., a system-wide database would be a significant tool to improve system security at all levels, it would also facilitate numerous administrative processes, such as staff rotation among organizations, United Nations laissez-passer issuances, cancellations, etc.).

34. Adopting a single set of data element standards could help in fully integrating HR and payroll processes across the United Nations system and would facilitate and simplify data interchange and the development of system-wide applications. It would significantly reduce the need for rework associated with the interconnection of different systems that require data conversion into a common format. The Inspectors believe that HLCM, as part of its mandate, and supported by the ICT Task Force, should develop common data element standards to be used by both payroll and HR systems system-wide.

35. The current organizations' different interpretation of common rules and regulations contributes to a lack of standardization that plays against any initiative aimed at improving the effectiveness and the efficiency of the system as a whole. As examples, representation allowances are paid at different intervals in different organizations and some organizations have established their own internal criteria in respect of grades or in the seniority requirements to be eligible for certain step increases (i.e., WHO has a P-6 grade equivalent to D-1). These issues can be easily overcome by current technology, but the lack of standardization has a direct impact on the costs associated with the required customizations.

36. One of the most important lessons learned by organizations that have implemented new information systems is that customizing information systems is expensive and time-consuming. Thus, a streamlining effort in respect of current working procedures and processes is a must. The Inspectors share this view and encourage such an initiative. It should be undertaken in parallel with the necessary harmonization of the interpretation of common rules and regulations as a step in the implementation of any information systems common solution. The current human resources reform might be a good opportunity for organizations to make an effort in this respect.

37. The harmonization of the interpretation of common rules and regulations should begin now for obvious reasons. Although it would be preferable to proceed with the harmonization as a first step, the harmonization effort should not prevent the consolidation of payroll systems from taking place simultaneously. The actual consolidation of payroll systems is not dependent on the full harmonization of the interpretation of common rules and regulations.

*(See **Recommendation 2 (b)**)*

Annex

Payroll systems used by various UN system organizations

Organizations	Payroll systems used					Remarks
	Developed in-house	Oracle	PeopleSoft	SAP	Other	
UN[14]	IMIS					
Funds and Programmes						
UNDP	IMIS		√			
UNFPA	IMIS		√			Handled by UNDP
UNHCR			√			
UNICEF				√		
WFP				√		
Specialized agencies and IAEA						
ILO		√				
FAO		√				
UNESCO	√					
ICAO	√					
WHO	√	√[15]				
UPU	√				Serin	
ITU					IBM	
WMO	√					
IMO				√		
WIPO					√	
UNIDO	√					
WTO (tourism)	√	√				
IAEA	PerMIS					

[14] It should be noted that the United Nations Secretariat also provides payroll services for the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) international and HQ general service staff who are included in the UNDP database, and handled by the Secretariat the same way as UNFPA staff; while the ITC joined the IMIS Payroll (administered by the United Nations Office at Geneva) in 2002, the Preparatory Committee for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) implemented and started administering a new IMIS site, including payroll services, in 2004.

[15] Oracle has been selected as vendor. The system is not yet functional.

United Nations A/60/583

General Assembly

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Sixtieth session
Agenda item 8
General debate

Letter dated 1 December 2005 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of a note verbale presented to the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship on 23 November 2005 (see annex).

I should be most grateful if you could arrange to have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 8.

(*Signed*) Emyr **Jones Parry**

05-63300 (E) 081205

Annex to the letter dated 1 December 2005 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

The Embassy of the United Kingdom presents its compliments to the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship and has the honour to acknowledge note No. 75/2005 of 27 October 2005.

The United Kingdom has no doubts about its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas. The United Kingdom reiterates that there can be no negotiations on the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands unless and until such time as the Falkland Islanders so wish.

The United Kingdom firmly rejects the Argentine protest concerning the Falkland Islands' fisheries legislation and reiterates that the Falkland Islands Government is entitled to adopt whatever measures it considers necessary to conserve, manage and exploit fish stocks within its waters. Furthermore, the United Kingdom rejects Argentine protests concerning the proclamations of the Falkland Islands' Interim and Outer Conservation Zones; the proclamation of the South Georgia Maritime Zone; and the closure by the Falkland Islands Government of the area between the Falkland Islands' Outer Conservation Zone and the Argentine 200-nautical mile limit.

The United Kingdom is disappointed that this matter is affecting the level of Argentine cooperation on the conservation of fisheries resources under the South Atlantic Fisheries Commission, which is in the mutual interests of all parties.

The Embassy of the United Kingdom takes this opportunity to renew to the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship the assurances of its highest consideration.

British Embassy
Buenos Aires

23 November 2005

United Nations A/60/584

General Assembly

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Sixtieth session
Agenda item 139
Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

Performance report on the budget of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005

Report of the Secretary-General

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05-63405 (E) 221205

Summary

The present report contains the performance report on the budget of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005.

The total expenditure for UNFICYP for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 has been linked to the mission's objective through a number of results-based frameworks, grouped by components, namely, substantive civilian, military, civilian police and support.

Performance of financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars. Budget year is from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005.)

			Variance	
Category	*Apportionment*	*Expenditure*	*Amount*	*Percentage*
Military and police personnel	22 573.4	21 685.5	1 887.9	8.0
Civilian personnel	11 848.4	12 162.6	(314.2)	(2.7)
Operational costs[a]	13 995.5	14 777.0	(781.5)	(5.6)
Gross requirements	**49 417.3**	**48 625.1**	**792.2**	**1.6**
Staff assessment income	2 323.8	1 984.7	339.1	14.6
Net requirements	**47 093.5**	**46 640.4**	**453.1**	**1.0**
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	1 274.4	1 355.8	(81.4)	(6.4)
Total requirements	**50 691.7**	**49 980.9**	**710.8**	**1.4**

[a] Includes expenditures of $2,089,200 for the strengthening of the security and safety of the staff and premises of the Force against the apportionment of $2,176,900.

Human resources incumbency performance

Category	*Approved*[a]	*Actual (average)*	*Vacancy rate (percentage)*
Military contingents[b]	1 239	1 066	13.3
Civilian police	69	46	33.3
International staff	46	39	15.2
National staff	109	108	0.9

[a] Represents the highest level of authorized strength.

[b] Represents the strength authorized prior to 22 October 2004. By its resolution 1568 (2004) of 22 October 2004, the Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendation to amend the force level from 1,230 to 860 military personnel.

The actions to be taken by the General Assembly are set out in section V of the present report.

I. Introduction

1. The budget for the maintenance of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 was set out in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 December 2003 (A/58/644) and amounted to $47,448,700 gross ($45,095,400 net), exclusive of budgeted voluntary contributions in kind in the amount of $1,274,400. It provided for 1,230 military contingent personnel, 69 civilian police officers, 48 international staff and 110 national staff. Subsequently, in his report on strengthening the security and safety of United Nations operations, staff and premises of 5 April 2004 (A/58/756), the Secretary-General proposed, inter alia, a number of security enhancements in UNFICYP requiring the acquisition of equipment and improvements to the physical infrastructure at a total estimated cost of $2,176,900.

2. On the basis of the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions contained in paragraph 21 of its report on the financing of UNFICYP of 13 April 2004 (A/58/759/Add.4) and in paragraph 27 of its report on the strengthening of the security and safety of United Nations operations, staff and premises of 6 April 2004 (A/58/758), the General Assembly, by its resolution 58/301 of 18 June 2004, appropriated an amount of $49,417,300 gross ($47,093,500 net) for UNFICYP for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 comprising the amount of $47,240,400 gross ($44,916,600 net) for the maintenance of the Force and $2,176,900 gross and net for the strengthening of the security and safety of the staff and premises of the Force. The appropriated amount included voluntary contributions from the Government of Cyprus in the amount of $16,444,900, equivalent to one third of the net cost of UNFICYP, and $6.5 million from the Government of Greece. An amount of $26,472,400 gross ($24,148,600 net) was assessed on Member States for the maintenance of UNFICYP and the strengthening of the security and safety of the staff and premises of the Force for that period.

II. Mandate performance

3. The mandate of UNFICYP was established by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964. The mandate for the performance period was provided by the Council in its resolutions 1548 (2004) of 11 June 2004 and 1568 (2004) of 22 October 2004.

4. By its resolution 1568 (2004), the Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendations for the amendment of the concept of operations and force level of UNFICYP from 1,230 to 860 military personnel, as outlined in his report of 24 September 2004 (S/2004/756).

5. UNFICYP is mandated to help the Security Council achieve an overall objective, namely, to ensure peace and security in Cyprus and the return to normal conditions.

6. Within this overall objective, UNFICYP has, during the performance report period, contributed to a number of accomplishments by delivering related key outputs, shown in the frameworks below. These frameworks are grouped by components: substantive civilian, military, civilian police and support.

7. The present report assesses actual performance against the planned results-based frameworks set out in the 2004/05 budget. In particular, the performance report

compares the actual indicators of achievement, i.e. the extent to which actual progress has been made during the period against the expected accomplishments, with the planned indicators of achievement and compares the actually completed outputs with the planned outputs.

Component 1: substantive civilian

Expected accomplishment 1.1: improved relations and understanding between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities building on the contacts from the opening of the crossings

Planned indicators of achievement	*Actual indicators of achievement*
No incidents at crossing points	8 incidents related primarily to the non-presentation of identification documents and lack of vehicle insurance documents required on the other side of the buffer zone
30 per cent increase in the number of cases effectively resolved by UNFICYP from 80 in 2002/03 to 104	335 cases resolved (related to arrests, detentions, prison visits, asylum-seeking, humanitarian relief and medical evacuations; farming, mine awareness and unauthorized civilian use of the buffer zone) compared to 80 in 2002/03 (319 per cent increase) and 250 in 2003/04 owing to increased cooperation by the parties and opening of the crossing points in April 2003
100 per cent increase in bicommunal events from 95 in 2002/03 to 190	106 events compared to 95 in 2002/03 (12 per cent increase) and 260 in 2003/04. Lower number owing to the opening of the crossing points and the consequent possibility for people from both sides to meet at will

Planned outputs	*Completed (number or yes/no)*	*Remarks*
Good offices to both sides to facilitate resolution of crossing-related issues provided	Yes	48 cases of intercession with the sides to ameliorate the situation of the individuals concerned
190 bicommunal meetings between political, private, professional and civil society groups facilitated	106	Lower number owing to the opening of the crossings points and the consequent possibility for people from both sides to meet at will
Daily liaison with guarantor powers and other Member States conducted	Yes	1,380 contacts (approximately 36 contacts per week)
100 meetings with representatives of both sides, non-governmental organizations and bicommunal groups conducted	106	Meetings
Daily contacts with local and international media to ensure objective coverage of developments in Cyprus and UNFICYP role and activities	Yes	1,000 contacts (approximately 20 contacts per week)

Daily liaison with north and south Public Information Offices	Yes	150 contacts. Lower number owing to the opening of the crossing points, which gradually reduced the need for daily liaison as media representatives were able to move more freely

Expected accomplishment 1.2: progress towards normalizing living conditions in the United Nations buffer zone and for Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north and Turkish Cypriots in the south

Planned indicators of achievement	*Actual indicators of achievement*
Increase in the number of infrastructure projects implemented in the United Nations buffer zone from 11 in 2002/03 to 13	14 infrastructure projects compared to 11 in 2002/03 and 12 in 2003/04 (construction of water wells and storage tanks, provision of electricity to farms and livestock stables)
Decrease in number of incidents involving both communities in the mixed village of Pyla by 25 per cent, from 36 in 2002/03 to 27	15 incidents compared to 36 in 2002/03 (58 per cent decrease) and 20 in 2003/04 related primarily to theft, burglaries, civil disputes and property damage
20 per cent of mines and unexploded ordnance cleared in the United Nations buffer zone	6 minefields completely cleared (225,000 m^2; over 2,000 mines) and 3 minefields declared mine-free through technical survey (174,000 m^2), representing 19 per cent of the total number of minefields
Better living conditions and facilities for 418 Greek Cypriots and 153 Maronites in the north and over 1,500 Turkish Cypriots in the south, including housing, medical care, education and employment for Turkish Cypriots in the south, and provision of high school and increased freedom of movement to Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north	398 Greek Cypriots and 149 Maronites living in the north as at 30 June 2005 6 housing occupancy issues resolved for Turkish Cypriots living in Limassol Turkish Cypriots receive free medical care in the south A written commitment by the Greek Cypriot side in March 2005 for the opening of a Turkish school in Limassol The Turkish Cypriot side granted permission in August 2004 for the upgrading of the school in Rizokarpaso to a secondary school and in March 2005 an agreement for the full complement of teachers was reached The Turkish Cypriot side announced in August 2004 that Maronites could sell a limited amount of land to buyers other than Greek Cypriots and in June 2005, Maronites living in the south were allowed to return to the north Permission granted for a second priest at the Karpas Church

Implementation of measures (actions, proposals, executive decisions) by the sides to improve general living conditions of Cypriots on both sides of the island	In February 2005, the European Union's green line regulation was amended to raise the ceiling on personal goods that can be taken across the line from €30 to €135 Agreement was reached in principle for Ledra Street and Zodhia Bostanci crossings to open Turkish Cypriot side does not impose restrictions on Greek Cypriots regarding the length of their stay and place of residence during visits to the north

Planned outputs	*Completed (number or yes/no)*	*Remarks*
2 infrastructure projects for the mutual benefit of both communities identified and facilitated	2	Repairs of the Venetian wall around the old city in Nicosia completed in October 2004 and restoration of the Pyla Venetian tower in December 2004 (both funded by the European Union through United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)/United Nations Development Programme (UNDP))
External funding for bicommunal projects, in particular the reconstruction of Pyla village square identified	No	Not achieved, as European Union funds were withdrawn owing to disagreement of the concerned parties on how the projects would proceed
Resolution of economic and legal issues between the two sides facilitated, as required	Yes	Facilitation of the parties' agreement on the following economic and legal issues: the European Union's green line regulation on trade, welfare services for Turkish Cypriots living in the south, permission for Maronites to sell a limited amount of land to buyers other than Greek Cypriots and permission for Turkish Cypriots to apply and obtain identification cards and passports
Demining activities (external funding) coordinated	Yes	Agreement obtained from both sides for demining activities in the Turkish Cypriot side of the minefields
Weekly humanitarian visits to Greek Cypriots in the Karpas area and to the Maronites in the north conducted	76	52 visits to Karpas and 24 to Maronite villages
Upgrading of the Greek Cypriot primary school in Rizokarpaso to high school facilitated	Yes	Facilitation of negotiations with both sides
Monthly meetings with Turkish Cypriots in the south held	64	52 meetings in Limassol and 12 in Paphos
50 medical evacuations conducted	30	The opening of crossing points negated the need to escort all but ambulances conveying the sick, injured or infirm

Regular briefings for the media on the opening of additional crossing points and related activities in the United Nations buffer zone	Yes	Daily media briefings, contacts and liaison, including public information support for demining activities; support to 20 international television crews covering UNFICYP activities
Improved and increased reporting on UNFICYP activities in mission publications, including enhanced use of website for public outreach regarding the United Nations buffer zone access for the public, new crossings, demining and minefield awareness	Yes	52 press releases, 40 UNFICYP website postings and 250 daily press cables

Component 2: military

Expected accomplishment 2.1: maintenance of ceasefire and the integrity of the United Nations buffer zone

Planned indicators of achievement	*Actual indicators of achievement*
Reduction in presence of the opposing forces in the United Nations buffer zone	Not achieved. The UNFICYP proposal for withdrawal of the sides' forces from selected close proximity positions was rejected
Reduction of 5 per cent of ceasefire violations from 1,863 violations in 2002/03 to 1,765	828 ceasefire violations in 2004/05 compared to 1,863 in 2002/03 (56 per cent reduction) and 1,765 in 2003/04. Decrease is attributable to the reduction of the military presence in the vicinity of the crossing points and to the calm military situation along the ceasefire lines
Reduction of 5 per cent in illegal access cases investigated to below 350 compared to 371 cases in 2002/03	200 illegal access cases investigated in 2004/05 compared to 371 in 2002/03 (46 per cent reduction) and 305 in 2003/04. Decrease is attributable to the opening of the crossing points
No violent demonstrations take place	No violent demonstrations
Maintenance of minefield perimeters within the United Nations buffer zone	Achieved. Minefield perimeters reduced as a result of the demining programme funded by the European Union
No civilian intruders illegally entering the United Nations buffer zone	347 intrusions (147 non-violent demonstrators (missing persons and freedom of religious services issues) and 200 farmers and hunters). Increase is attributable to the calm military situation along the ceasefire lines and the increased flow of people through the crossing points

Planned outputs	*Completed (number or yes/no)*	*Remarks*
24,820 troops permanent manned observation post days (4 troops per post x 17 posts x 365 days)	10 000	Decrease is attributable to the downsizing of the Force pursuant to Security Council resolution 1568 (2004) and a change from a manned patrol base to a mobile concept of operations
27,740 troops patrol base observation post days (4 troops per post x 19 posts x 365 days)	17 252	Decrease is attributable to the downsizing of the Force and a change from a manned patrol base to a mobile concept of operations
5,840 troops observation post days (2 troops per post x 8 posts x 365 days)	2 876	Decrease is attributable to the downsizing of the Force and a change from a manned patrol base to a mobile concept of operations
35,770 troops mobile patrol days (2 troops per vehicle x 49 patrols per day x 365 days)	72 706	Increase is attributable to a change from a manned patrol base to a mobile concept of operations
1,188 air patrol hours (49.5 hours per month average per helicopter x 2 helicopters x 12 months) covering full length of the United Nations buffer zone	1 181	Air patrol hours
	49.2	Average hours per month per helicopter
	2	Helicopters
Daily liaison with opposing forces at all levels maintained	Yes	758 meetings by Force military personnel
Immediate intervention to rectify violations	Yes	3,650 troop deployments (10 troops x 365 days)
Reserves to react to crowd control incidents and demonstrations maintained: – 4 platoons at 2 hours' notice to move (24 hours a day) – 1 platoon at 4 hours' notice to move (24 hours a day) – 4 platoons at 6 hours' notice to move (24 hours a day) – 1 helicopter at 45 minutes' notice to move (24 hours a day)	Yes	Owing to the implementation of the new military concept of operations, from 15 November 2004, the number of platoons at 6 hours' notice to move was reduced from 4 to 1 In addition, 5 Force Military Police Units patrols maintained during the reporting period
Monthly meetings with the authorities to prevent violent demonstrations held	24	2 meetings per month
Fences of 48 minefields located inside the United Nations buffer zone maintained	Yes	Following the demining programme funded by the European Union, fences from 9 minefields were removed
Full length of United Nations buffer zone (146 km) maintained and controlled	Yes	

Security of United Nations installations in 12 camp areas, 2 liaison posts, 2 checkpoints maintained	Yes	Owing to the reduction of the Force and relocation of troops, from 15 November 2004, 5 camp areas, 2 liaison posts and 2 checkpoints maintained
	17 784	Patrol base duty patrol days Additional output owing to the implementation of the new military concept of operations

Component 3: civilian police

Expected accomplishment 3.1: enhanced performance of law enforcement agencies in the United Nations buffer zone, including improved freedom of movement between the two communities

Planned indicators of achievement	*Actual indicators of achievement*
Reduction of 5 per cent in the number of incidents related to violation of law and order in the United Nations buffer zone and on both sides owing to the opening of crossing points from 99 in 2002/03 to 94	95 incidents in 2004/05 (75 hunting, 3 shooting and 17 theft) compared to 99 in 2002/03 (4 per cent reduction) and 122 in 2003/04
Increased cooperation of the police and law enforcement agencies in inter-communal cases	Not achieved. A total of 380 criminal and humanitarian cases were referred to the Mission from individuals on both sides for follow-up; all but 27 were addressed through UNFICYP mediation, as there was no direct communication or cooperation between the police authorities in the South and in the North
Reduction in number of incidents between the two sides in the mixed village of Pyla	3 incidents
Increase of 25 per cent in number of civilian crossing points, from 4 in 2002/03 to 5, and extended duration of civilians' stay on the other side	Four crossing points remained open and the two sides agreed in principle on the opening of Zodhia/Bostanci and Ledra Street crossing points

Planned outputs	*Completed (number or yes/no)*	*Remarks*
4,000 patrols conducted in the United Nations buffer zone, including patrolling villages and crossing points	4 750	Increase is attributable to the deployment of additional civilian police officers and the implementation of the coordinated patrol plan with the military component
120 weekly contacts with villagers and community leaders conducted	179	Increase is attributable to the deployment of additional civilian police officers
950 contacts and information-sharing opportunities with Cyprus Police and Turkish Cypriot Police at both mission headquarters and local levels facilitated	850	Contacts

3 visits every school-week to each of the two schools in Pyla organized to develop interaction between students and reduce tension in the village	31	Total number of visits
50 weekly contacts to increase cooperation between the two communities in Pyla arranged	22	Village meetings
Trials on both sides involving persons originally from the other community monitored at the request of the 2 communities to ensure due process	Yes	22 trials monitored

Expected accomplishment 3.2: improved delivery of humanitarian assistance for Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north, and Turkish Cypriots in the south on both sides of the United Nations buffer zone

Planned indicators of achievement	*Actual indicators of achievement*
Decrease of 50 per cent in number of complaints from recipients of humanitarian assistance on both sides	No complaints received

Planned outputs	*Completed (number of yes/no)*	*Remarks*
156 biweekly humanitarian assistance patrols escorted	184	Increase is attributable to additional number of humanitarian patrols to Limassol to assist Turkish Cypriots
Pilgrimages to 5 religious sites on both sides of the United Nations buffer zone escorted	2	Greek Cypriots escorted to 2 sites in the United Nations buffer zone and 2 Greek Cypriot services monitored in the north at St. Mammas and St. Barnabas churches

Component 4: support

Expected accomplishment 4.1: effective and efficient logistical and administrative support to the mission

Planned indicators of achievement	*Actual indicators of achievement*
Improvement of living conditions of 60 military personnel	84 troops relocated and 12 troops provided with new accommodation units
Inventory value of assets awaiting write-off and disposal reduced from 7.5 per cent of total inventory value as at 30 June 2003 to 5 per cent as at 30 June 2005	Inventory value of assets awaiting write-off and disposal was 9.6 per cent of total inventory value as at 30 June 2005 compared to 7.5 per cent as at 30 June 2003 and 4.8 per cent as at 30 June 2004. The increase is attributable to write-off action initiated at the end of the 2004/05 period but not completed by 30 June 2005 in respect of a substantial number of assets valued at $0.8 million

No delay in transmission of operational information between UNFICYP headquarters, sectors and observation posts	Achieved through the utilization of commercial High bit-rate Digital Subscriber Lines (HDSL), installation of 10 new narrow-band microwave links and upgrading of routers and telephone systems
Rate of traffic accidents involving UNFICYP personnel reduced from the average of 17 per month in 2002/03 to 15 per month in 2004/05	Average of 9 traffic accidents per month compared to 17 in 2002/03 and 10 in 2003/04 owing to the implementation of the Road Safety Programme and organization of Contingent Safe and Skilled Driving competitions
Provision of security plans in the mission area	Security plan for all United Nations agencies, funds and programmes present in Cyprus
	Contingency operational plans for multiple security scenarios
	Semi-annual security risk assessment
	Access control search procedures and explosives search procedures for mail, luggage and vehicles

Planned outputs	*Completed (number or yes/no)*	*Remarks*
Military and police personnel		
1,230 troops and 69 civilian police supported	1 066	Average troop strength owing to downsizing of the Force pursuant to Security Council resolution 1568 (2004)
	46	Average civilian police strength
Civilian personnel		
158 staff (48 international and 110 national (General Service)) administered	147	Average total civilian personnel
	39	Average international staff
	108	Average national staff
		155 total authorized civilian personnel for the period (46 international and 109 national staff)
Facilities and infrastructure		
22 new prefabricated accommodation units, 1 kitchen unit constructed and 116 existing accommodation units maintained		20 new accommodation units to be installed in October 2005 owing to their delivery at the end of the 2004/05 period
	1	100-man kitchen unit
	116	Accommodation units maintained
		In addition, 28 accommodation units dismantled and reconstructed

Electrical infrastructure at Camp Roca (sector 1) and Camp Berger (sector 4) upgraded	Yes (Camp Roca)	Electrical upgrade project commenced (phase 1 completed in May 2005), phase 2 (installation of transformer) to commence in May 2006
	No (Camp Berger)	Closed owing to the reduction of the Force
135 generators maintained	108	Owing to the reduction of the Force, generators not suitable for transfer to other peacekeeping operations were written off and sold
540 km of patrol tracks rebuilt and maintained	37 km	Rebuilt
	85 km	Maintained
		Owing to prioritization of work to cover critical tasks (washing-away of patrol tracks owing to floods and heavy rain, filling potholes and clearing drainage channels)
		In addition, shatter-resistant film installed in all operational areas
Ground transportation		
75 United Nations-owned, 42 contingent-owned and 265 rented vehicles maintained and operated	78	United Nations-owned vehicles
	42	Contingent-owned vehicles
	253	Rented vehicles
Air transportation		
Operations of 2 helicopters supported	2	Helicopters
Communications		
Mission-wide communications and information technology network for 1,230 military personnel, 69 civilian police and 158 international and national staff upgraded and maintained	Yes	Networks upgraded through the utilization of 3 new HDSL links and the installation of 3 new microwave links and 5 new telephone switchboards
	1 066	Average military personnel
	46	Average civilian police
	147	Average international and national staff
30 telecommunication towers and 21 digital microwave links for the establishment of a terrestrial microwave network maintained	30	Telecommunication towers (includes 7 towers dismantled by the end of the 2004/05 period owing to the reduction of the Force)
	20	Digital microwave links (10 broadband and 10 new narrow band)

290 hand-held radios and 455 mobile/base stations to ensure operability of the island-wide 2-way radio network maintained	223	Hand-held radios
		Lower number owing to the reduction of the Force
	592	Mobile/base stations
		Represents holdings as at 30 June 2005, including 265 obsolete mobile/base stations to be written off during the 2005/06 period owing to the receipt from the United Nations Logistics Base of new stations compliant with the Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS)
Information technology		
275 desktop computers, 45 laptop computers, 13 file servers, 34 scanners, 263 printers, 43 photocopiers, 280 uninterrupted power supply units maintained	323	Desktop computers
	54	Laptop computers
	18	File servers
	39	Scanners
	203	Printers
	48	Photocopiers
	420	Power supply units
		Represents holdings as at 30 June 2005, including items to be written off during the 2005/06 period
Disaster recovery site, including document management and active directory services implemented	Yes	
4 permanently manned Joint Operations Centres with radio, fax and telephone facilities established	4	Joint Operations Centres compliant with MOSS
Wide-area networks supporting 1,000 users maintained	750	Users. Decrease is attributable to the reduction of the Force
Local area networks (LAN) at 6 locations maintained; access to LAN from 13 locations provided	8	LAN locations
		2 new LAN locations established owing to the increased presence of military and civilian police personnel in Pyla
	8	Locations with access to LAN
		Lower number of locations with access to LAN owing to the reduction of the Force

Medical		
1,230 military personnel and 69 civilian police officers provided with medical and health care	1 066	Average military personnel
	46	Average civilian police
		Total of 4,544 cases treated
Service improvement		
Reception plan for missions evacuating to Cyprus as a safe haven updated	Yes	Semi-annual review in May 2005
UNFICYP and other United Nations agencies (UNOPS, UNDP, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations Volunteers and United Nations Children's Fund) evacuation plan updated	Yes	Update in May 2005

III. Resource performance

A. Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars. Budget year is from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005.)

Category	Apportionment (1)	Expenditure (2)	Variance Amount (3) = (1) - (2)	Variance Percentage (4) = (3) ÷ (1)
Military and police personnel				
Military observers	—	—	—	—
Military contingents	23 128.7	21 016.3	2 112.4	9.1
Civilian police	444.7	669.2	(224.5)	(50.5)
Formed police units	—	—	—	—
Subtotal	**23 573.4**	**21 685.5**	**1 887.9**	**8.0**
Civilian personnel				
International staff	6 505.3	6 133.9	371.4	5.7
National staff	5 343.1	6 028.7	(685.6)	(12.8)
United Nations Volunteers	—	—	—	—
Subtotal	**11 848.4**	**12 162.6**	**(314.2)**	**(2.7)**
Operational costs				
General temporary assistance	50.0	124.5	(74.5)	(149.0)
Government-provided personnel	—	—	—	—
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—	—
Consultants	—	—	—	—
Official travel	233.9	197.5	36.4	15.6
Facilities and infrastructure[a]	7 803.7	8 289.2	(485.5)	(6.2)
Ground transportation	2 003.0	2 300.7	(297.7)	(14.9)
Air transportation	1 497.9	1 457.6	40.3	2.7
Naval transportation	—	—	—	—
Communications	938.1	891.8	46.3	4.9
Information technology	761.7	770.4	(8.7)	(1.1)
Medical	225.4	297.0	(71.6)	(31.8)
Special equipment	6.3	2.4	3.9	61.9
Other supplies, services and equipment[b]	475.5	445.9	29.6	6.2
Quick-impact projects	—	—	—	—
Subtotal	**13 995.5**	**14 777.0**	**(781.5)**	**(5.6)**
Gross requirements	**49 417.3**	**48 625.1**	**792.2**	**1.6**
Staff assessment income	2 323.8	1 984.7	339.1	14.6
Net requirements	**47 093.5**	**46 640.4**	**453.1**	**1.0**
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)[c]	1 274.4	1 355.8	(81.4)	(6.4)
Total requirements	**50 691.7**	**49 980.9**	**710.8**	**1.4**

[a] Includes expenditures of $2,057,400 for the strengthening of the security and safety of the staff and premises of the Force against the apportionment of $2,149,900.

[b] Includes expenditures of $31,800 for the strengthening of the security and safety of the staff and premises of the Force against the apportionment of $27,000.

[c] Includes $1,342,633 from the Government of Cyprus and $13,131 from the Government of the United Kingdom.

B. Other income and adjustments

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category	Amount
Interest income	260.5
Other/miscellaneous income	166.1
Voluntary contributions in cash	—
Prior-period adjustments	(40.1)
Savings on or cancellation of prior-period obligations	154.6
Total	**541.1**

C. Expenditure for contingent-owned equipment: major equipment and self-sustainment

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category	Expenditure
Major equipment	1 462.9
Self-sustainment (minor engineering)	290.7
Total	**1 753.6**

Mission factors	Percentage	Effective date	Last review date
A. Applicable to mission area			
B. Applicable to home country			
Incremental transportation factor	0.25-3.75		

D. Value of non-budgeted contributions

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category	Actual value
Status-of-forces agreement*	225.2
Voluntary contributions in kind (non-budgeted)	—
Total	**225.2**

* Inclusive of market value, as estimated by UNFICYP, of the cost of United Nations observation posts and office and accommodation facilities provided by the Government of Cyprus to the Force for military contingents and civilian police units.

IV. Analysis of variances[1]

		Variance
Military contingents	$2 112.4	9.1%

8. The unutilized balance under this heading is attributable to the phased repatriation of military personnel in January, February and April 2005 pursuant to Security Council resolution 1568 (2004) and the resulting lower average deployment of 1,066 personnel compared to the budgeted 1,230 military personnel.

		Variance
Civilian police	($224.5)	(50.5%)

9. The additional requirements under this heading are attributable to an increase in the daily mission subsistence allowance rate from the budgeted $12 to $25 on 1 July 2004 and $36 on 1 August 2004, combined with the appreciation of the Cyprus pound against the United States dollar when the mission subsistence allowance became payable in local currency (£C 17) from 1 February 2005 offset in part by a higher actual vacancy rate (33.3 per cent compared to the budgeted 10 per cent), with an average deployment of 46 civilian police personnel for the period.

		Variance
International staff	$371.4	5.7%

10. The unspent balance under this heading reflects lower actual staff assessment expenditure incurred during the reporting period compared to the standard costs used for the estimation of staff assessment requirements in the budget combined with a higher average vacancy rate for international staff (15.2 per cent) because of the mission's decision to block 8 vacated international posts owing to the reduction from 1 July 2005 of the international staffing establishment of the Division of Administration by three Field Service posts and the conversion of five Field Service posts to national staff posts, offset in part by an increase during the reporting period of the post adjustment multiplier, ranging from 38 to 47.5, compared to 27.6 used in the budget and the introduction of a revised international staff salary scale effective 1 January 2005.

		Variance
National staff	($685.6)	(12.8%)

11. The variance under this heading is attributable to the 11 per cent appreciation of the Cyprus pound against the United States dollar (an average of £C 0.455 compared to the budgeted £C 0.510) and to a 5.7 per cent salary scale increase effective 1 September 2004.

[1] Resource variance amounts are expressed in thousands of United States dollars.

	Variance	
General temporary assistance	($74.5)	(149.0%)

12. The additional requirements under this heading are attributable to the temporary replacement of one Administrative Assistant pending the recruitment of an international staff member, as well as to the replacement of three national staff on extended sick leave and the short-term hiring of one temporary finance, one procurement and three communications personnel to avoid disruption of service following the transfer to other peacekeeping missions of international staff occupying posts subsequently converted from 1 July 2005 to national staff posts.

	Variance	
Official travel	$36.4	15.6%

13. The unutilized balance under this heading is attributable to the reduced official travel requirements to destinations outside the mission area and the resulting lower number of trips actually undertaken during the reporting period, as well as lower expenditure in respect of training-related travel owing to the application of the train-the-trainers policy and the provision of training locally.

	Variance	
Facilities and infrastructure	($485.5)	(6.2%)

14. The additional requirements under this heading are attributable primarily to the unforeseen requirements in connection with the relocation of military contingent personnel to centralized locations following the reduction of the force level and closure of camps, patrol bases and observation posts, combined with the 11 per cent appreciation of the Cyprus pound against the United States dollar and the resulting higher cost of supplies and services provided locally, as well as to increases in the cost of diesel fuel and contractual maintenance services. Expenditure incurred under the above heading against a provision of $2,149,900 for strengthening the security and safety of the staff and premises of the Force amounted to $2,057,400 and included the acquisition and installation of a closed-circuit television system, shatter-proof materials, automatic gate systems and security barriers, prefabricated blast walls, concrete barriers, various items of security equipment (X-ray screening systems, metal and explosives detectors) and supplies, as well as security enhancement engineering projects.

	Variance	
Ground transportation	($297.7)	(14.9%)

15. The variance under this heading is attributable to the 196 per cent increase in the rental cost of nine cross-country 4x4 vehicles effective 1 July 2004, the increase in the cost of fuel combined with the appreciation of the Cyprus pound during the reporting period, as well as expenditure related to the acquisition of nine cross-country 4x4 vehicles, delivered in June 2005, as their continued commercial rental became financially non-viable owing to the increase in rental costs, offset in part by a lower number of rented vehicles (253 compared to the budgeted 265).

	Variance	
Information technology	($8.7)	(1.1%)

16. The additional requirements under this heading are attributable to the acquisition of fibre-optic transceivers and switches to support the network upgrade and data-processing equipment for data storage and disaster recovery, offset in part by reduced requirements for maintenance and repair services owing to the utilization of in-house repair capabilities in lieu of local contractors and the lower cost of licenses owing to the introduction of a new cost-effective software volume licensing agreement.

	Variance	
Medical	($71.6)	(31.8%)

17. The additional requirements under this heading are attributable to the increased costs of medical services provided by private doctors and clinics and the increased costs of medicines and medical supplies combined with the appreciation of the Cyprus pound during the reporting period.

	Variance	
Special equipment	$3.9	61.9%

18. The variance under this heading is attributable to the lower actual cost of 21 binoculars (12 replacement and 9 additional) for the civilian police personnel owing to favourable prices obtained on the market.

	Variance	
Other supplies, services and equipment	$29.6	6.2%

19. The unspent balance under this heading is primarily attributable to savings resulting from the utilization of existing military accoutrements stocks and supplies and reduced requirements for military haircutting services and welfare activities following the reduction of the military contingent strength, as well as lower actual expenditure on training fees and supplies owing to fewer training courses undertaken during the reporting period. Reduced requirements under this heading were partially offset by higher actual freight and customs clearance expenditure owing to the transfer of a forklift, a medium cargo truck and a bulldozer, communications equipment and one prefabricated kitchen unit from the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, and other missions, as well as the acquisition of miscellaneous security items (respirators, chemical suits and decontamination showers) for the strengthening of the security and safety of the staff and premises of the Force.

V. Actions to be taken by the General Assembly

20. **The actions to be taken by the General Assembly in connection with the financing of UNFICYP are:**

(a) **To decide that Member States shall waive their respective shares in other income for the period ended 30 June 2005 amounting to $541,100 and their respective shares in the amount of $191,300 from the unencumbered balance of $792,200 for the period ended 30 June 2005, to be applied to meeting the current and future after-service health insurance liabilities of the United Nations;**

(b) **To decide on the treatment of the remaining unencumbered balance of $600,900 for the period ended 30 June 2005.**

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Agenda item 124
Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007

Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted in the context of action taken or expected to be taken by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council regarding special political missions, including good offices, and preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peacebuilding missions, on the basis of requests from Governments and/or recommendations of the Secretary-General.

By its resolution 59/278 of 23 December 2004, the General Assembly endorsed the recommendation of the Advisory Committee contained in paragraph 11 of its report (A/59/600) for a preliminary estimate of $3,760 million for the biennium 2006-2007, including a provision of $355,949,300 for the special political missions related to peace and security that are expected to be extended into or approved during the course of the biennium 2006-2007.

The present report contains the proposed resource requirements for the period up to 31 December 2006 for 26 special political missions authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council, except for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL). The mandate of UNAMA is expected to change substantially at the end of the current mandate, in March 2006. Similarly, it is anticipated that UNOTIL will complete its current mandate and will not be extended. Accordingly, the budgets for these missions are proposed for 3 months and 4.7 months, respectively.

The total estimated requirements of those missions amount to $280,803,200 net ($297,498,900 gross) and would be charged against the above-mentioned provision for special political missions proposed under section 3, Political affairs, of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007.

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I. Introduction

1. The purpose of the present report is to seek funding for the first year of the biennium 2006-2007 for 26 special political missions in connection with actions taken or expected to be taken by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council on the basis of requests from Member States and/or recommendations of the Secretary-General. Although the resource requirements for one special political mission, namely, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar, whose mandate emanates from the General Assembly, will be sought through the submission of a statement of programme budget implications in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the Assembly, those requirements are also presented in the current report so as to consolidate the overall requirements for all special political missions. This is in keeping with the request of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions contained in A/57/7/Add.17, paragraph 5. It should be noted, however, that any expenditures against appropriations for political missions would be strictly subject to the extension of the relevant mandate.

2. Mandates for the majority of the special political missions presented here have been renewed or extended into the next biennium, and requests for the extension or renewal of mandates of the remaining few missions are before, or are being submitted to, the Security Council.

3. Of the 26 missions whose requirements are set out in the present report:

(a) One mission (the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar) is under consideration by the General Assembly, and the related statement of programme budget implications has been submitted to the Assembly (A/C.5/60/17);

(b) Four missions (the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Lebanon, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide and the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara) have open-ended mandates;

(c) Three missions (the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia) have mandates until 31 December 2007;

(d) Four missions (the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1526 (2004), the Office of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the International Advisory and Monitoring Board, the United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission and the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone) have mandates until 31 December 2006;

(e) Seven missions (the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the support for the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the Monitoring Group on Somalia, the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste, the United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq) have mandates until various dates in 2006, ranging from the end of January to 11 August;

(f) Seven missions (the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Africa, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, the Panel of Experts on Liberia, the United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic, the Panel of Experts concerning the Sudan and the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire) have mandates expiring during the course of December 2005. It is anticipated that the Security Council will extend the mandates of these missions on the basis of reports and requests already submitted or to be submitted to it.

4. It is assumed that all the missions mentioned above that have not yet been extended will be extended for periods similar to those approved for 2005.

5. The present report provides the summary of the requirements for 2006 by mission and the corresponding staffing tables.

Complementarities and synergies

6. Efforts are being made to achieve complementarities and synergies among various missions and other United Nations entities. Such efforts include exchanges between various monitoring groups and panels established by the Security Council, with regard to aviation, arms trafficking, customs, finance and other areas, of substantive information obtained as a result of fieldwork. Where possible, field missions assist monitoring bodies with valuable logistical arrangements. Special Representatives of the Secretary-General are being kept informed about the work of the monitoring bodies so that they can take their findings into account when addressing the political underpinnings of some of the conflict situations. Experts, such as some of those of the Al-Qaida and Taliban Monitoring Team, regularly visit various institutions, such as Interpol, to stay in close personal contact with interlocutors. The relevant branch of the Security Council Division of the Department of Political Affairs endeavours to put relevant monitoring bodies in touch with one another when information that would be of mutual interest to the groups concerned comes to its attention. Also, because of the reporting cycles set out in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, several expert groups and panels tend to be in New York at the same time. On these occasions, face-to-face meetings are customarily arranged, which allow them to share and discuss methodological approaches, substantive findings, and ways to promote further cooperation once the groups have left New York. The Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire, for instance, cooperates with other relevant groups of experts, in particular the Panel of Experts on Liberia established by resolution 1521 (2003) and re-established by resolutions 1579 (2004) and 1607 (2005). The experts of these groups also stay in contact to ensure that their visits to relevant countries in the region, in particular Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, are undertaken in a coordinated manner.

7. Similar efforts are also made in the area of administrative and logistical support to achieve efficiency. For instance, the Monitoring Group on Somalia is co-located with the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, and while the Monitoring Group pays rent and utility costs to the United Nations Office at Nairobi, the Great Lakes Office provides administrative and logistical support, such as the making of travel arrangements and the issuance of staff contracts at no additional cost. Likewise, the experts of the

Panel on Liberia receive support from the United Nations Mission in Liberia. When the members of the Panel are in Monrovia, they are provided with office space, computers and vehicles.

8. The Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo also receives support from the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), which arranges the hotel reservations and travel of the Group within the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in the region. MONUC also provides offices for the Group and makes arrangements for the disbursement of its daily subsistence allowances, with financial authorization from Headquarters, and liaises with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the meetings the Group requests. Similarly, the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire receives support from the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) in the form of the use of UNOCI vehicles for local transportation in Abidjan, armed escorts for trips up-country and seats on UNOCI flights within Côte d'Ivoire, as well as temporary use of office space, computers and fax. The Panel of Experts concerning the Sudan also receives support from the Economic Commission for Africa in the form of office space and common services on a cost-sharing basis.

II. Estimated resource requirements for special political missions emanating from decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council

9. The total requirements for the special political missions presented in the present report are estimated at $280,803,200 net ($297,498,900 gross). Mission-by-mission budget estimates, requirements by component and the staffing requirements are presented in tables 1, 2 and 3 below.

10. Table 1 contains a complete list of the political missions, indicating their respective revised appropriations for the biennium 2004-2005, commitments authorized during 2005 and estimated expenditures and requirements for the next budget period (2006), as well as their mandates and expiry dates. Also included in table 1 are operations that have been completed or subsumed under other missions during 2004-2005 and for which no resources are requested for 2006.

11. A substantial portion of the resources sought in the present report relates to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) (62.8 per cent), followed by the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (8.3 per cent), the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (4.8 per cent) and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (4.8 per cent). The proposed individual budgets for political missions range from $209,700 for the activities of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Africa to $173,376,200 for UNAMI.

12. An overall summary of requirements by major expenditure component is presented in table 2. Staffing requirements account for 45.2 per cent of the requirements.

13. The staffing requirements of each mission, by category and level, are presented in table 3. The overall change in staffing requirements includes a net decrease of 266 positions from the 2005 level. This change reflects the positions discontinued as a result of the completion of some missions, the transformation of

others into peace operations, the increases under some of the continuing missions and requirements of new ones.

14. The action requested of the General Assembly with respect to financing is set out in section III below.

15. Information on charges against the provision for special political missions and its balances is provided in the annex.

Table 1

Estimated costs of activities of special political missions

(Thousands of United States dollars)

		Revised appropriation and expenditures 2004-2005							
		Appropriations	*Commitment authority*	*Redeployments*	*Estimated expenditures*	*Variance*	*Total requirements for 2006*	*Periods covered by this budget*	*Mandates and expiry dates*
		1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5 = (1+2+3-4)*	*6*	*7*	*8*
I	**Continuing and new missions:**								
A	**Special political missions emanating from decisions of the General Assembly**								
1	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar	492.1	—	—	399.7	92.4	210.4	1 year	Draft resolution before the General Assembly (A/C.3/60/L.53) (31 December 2006)
	Subtotal	**492.1**	**—**	**—**	**399.7**	**92.4**	**210.4**		
B	**Special political missions emanating from decisions of the Security Council and other political initiatives relating to the maintenance of international peace and security**								
2	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau	5 392.5	—	—	4 818.5	574.0	3 226.2	1 year	S/2004/874, S/2004/875 (December 2005)
3	Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Africa	212.6	—	237.5	199.4	250.7	209.7	1 year	S/2004/1019, S/2004/1020 (December 2005)
4	Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region of Africa	3 758.0	—	—	3 685.0	73.0	2 151.2	1 year	S/2004/904, S/2004/905 (December 2005)
5	Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	1 695.8	—	(237.5)	1 077.0	381.3	406.3	1 year	Open-ended mandate
6	Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities	5 867.1	—	—	4 802.4	1 064.7	3 453.3	1 year	Security Council resolution 1617 (2005) (31 December 2006)

	Revised appropriation and expenditures 2004-2005							
	Appropriations	*Commitment authority*	*Redeployments*	*Estimated expenditures*	*Variance*	*Total requirements for 2006*	*Periods covered by this budget*	*Mandates and expiry dates*
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5 = (1+2+3-4)*	*6*	*7*	*8*
7 **Monitoring Group on Somalia**	2 629.0	—	—	2 098.8	530.2	1 626.6	1 year	Security Council resolution 1630 (2005) (May 2006)
8 **Panel of Experts on Liberia**	2 117.1	—	499.0	2 190.3	425.8	1 469.6	1 year	Security Council resolution 1607 (2005) (21 December 2005)
9 **Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo**	1 912.5	—	—	1 729.4	183.1	1 477.9	10 months in 2006	Security Council resolution 1616 (2005) (31 January 2006)
10 **Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide**	1 209.9	—	—	713.1	496.8	888.7	1 year	Security Council resolution 1366 (2001), S/2004/567, S/2004/568 (open-ended mandate)
11 **Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate**	6 779.3	—	—	4 831.1	1 948.2	7 579.7	1 year	Security Council resolution 1535 (2004) (December 2007)
12 **United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan**	121 681.4	—	(499.0)	104 896.6	16 285.8	13 616.9	First 3 months of 2006	Security Council resolution 1589 (2005) (23 March 2006)
13 **United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq**	176 576.0	—	—	134 345.8	42 230.2	173 376.2	1 year	Security Council resolution 1619 (2005) (11 August 2006)
14 **United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding**	3 804.7	—	—	3 211.9	592.8	2 170.6	1 year	S/2005/323, S/2005/324 (1 June 2006)
15 **Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Lebanon**	1 694.3	—	—	1 795.4	(101.1)	1 698.6	1 year	Open-ended mandate
16 **United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission**	9 357.5	—	—	6 580.6	2 776.9	7 339.0	1 year	S/2005/528, S/2005/529 (December 2006)

		Revised appropriation and expenditures 2004-2005							
		Appropriations	*Commitment authority*	*Redeployments*	*Estimated expenditures*	*Variance*	*Total requirements for 2006*	*Periods covered by this budget*	*Mandates and expiry dates*
		1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5 = (1+2+3-4)*	*6*	*7*	*8*
17	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic	10 472.2	—	—	10 073.5	398.7	6 467.4	1 year	S/2004/874, S/2004/875 (December 2005)
18	United Nations Political Office for Somalia	6 812.8	—	—	4 630.6	2 182.2	7 129.2	1 year	S/2005/729, S/2005/730 (December 2007)
19	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa	4 914.7	—	—	3 996.7	918.0	4 150.4	1 year	S/2004/797, S/2004/858 (December 2007)
20	Support for the Security Council Committee established by Council resolution 1540 (2004)	1 816.7	—	—	1 459.9	356.8	2 181.7	1 year	Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) (April 2006)
21	Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	—	222.6	—	222.6	—	357.3	1 year	S/2005/497, S/2005/498 (open-ended mandate)
22	United Nations Office in Timor-Leste	21 939.9	—	—	21 939.9	—	13 584.8	4.75 months in 2006	Security Council resolution 1599 (2005) (20 May 2006)
23	Panel of Experts concerning the Sudan	—	955.9	—	919.7	36.2	1 725.7	1 year	Security Council resolution 1591 (2005) (31 December 2005)
24	Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire	—	488.3	—	655.9	(167.6)	700.7	8 months in 2006	Security Council resolution 1632 (2005) (15 December 2005)
25	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone	—	—	—	—	—	23 298.6	1 year	Security Council resolution 1620 (2005) (31 December 2006)
26	Office of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the International Advisory and Monitoring Board	418.7	—	—	368.8	49.9	306.5	1 year	Security Council resolution 1637 (2005) (31 December 2006)
	Subtotal B	**391 062.7**	**1 666.8**	**—**	**321 242.9**	**71 486.6**	**280 592.8**		
	Total I (A+B)	**391 554.8**	**1 666.8**	**—**	**321 642.6**	**71 579.0**	**280 803.2**		

		Revised appropriation and expenditures 2004-2005							
		Appropriations	*Commitment authority*	*Redeployments*	*Estimated expenditures*	*Variance*	*Total requirements for 2006*	*Periods covered by this budget*	*Mandates and expiry dates*
		1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5 = (1+2+3-4)*	*6*	*7*	*8*
II	**Special political missions that have been completed or integrated with other operations**								
27	United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire	7 102.7	—	—	7 102.7	—	—		Transformed into peacekeeping mission (United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire)
28	United Nations Office in Burundi	5 353.2	—	—	5 353.2	—	—		Transformed into peacekeeping mission (United Nations Operation in Burundi)
29	United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan	43 060.7	—	—	43 060.7	—	—		Transformed into peacekeeping mission (United Nations Mission in the Sudan)
30	United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville	2 307.9	—	—	2 307.9	—	—		Completed
31	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala	7 007.2	—	—	7 007.2	—	—		Completed
32	Central American peace process	378.3	—	—	378.3	—	—		Completed
	Total II	**65 210.0**	**—**	**—**	**65 210.0**	**—**	**—**		
	Grand total (I+II)	**456 764.8**	**1 666.8**	**—**	**386 852.6**	**71 579.0**	**280 803.2**		

Table 2
Summary of requirements by major component
(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January 2004 to 31 December 2005					*1 January to 31 December 2006*	
Category of expenditure	*Appropriations* 1	*Commitments* 2	*Redeployments* 3	*Expenditures* 4	*Variance* 5 = (1+2+3-4)	*Total requirements* 6	*Non-recurrent requirements* 7
I. Military and police personnel							
1. Military observers	2 175.5	—	—	1 952.2	223.3	2 363.3	—
2. Military contingents	26 885.8	—	—	15 519.4	11 366.4	28 859.3	—
3. Civilian police	3 004.7	—	—	2 672.5	332.2	2 421.4	—
Subtotal, category I	**32 066.0**	**—**	**—**	**20 144.1**	**11 921.9**	**33 644.0**	**—**
II. Civilian personnel							
1. International staff	150 446.0	133.4	(6.0)	122 587.3	27 986.1	108 668.2	—
2. National staff	31 909.2	5.8	—	28 199.7	3 715.3	16 016.8	—
3. United Nations Volunteers	4 592.8	—	—	4 870.2	(277.4)	2 296.4	—
Subtotal, category II	**186 948.0**	**139.2**	**(6.0)**	**155 657.2**	**31 424.0**	**126 981.4**	**—**
III. Operational costs							
1. General temporary assistance	3 162.1	—	—	3 139.0	23.1	2 578.6	—
2. Consultants and experts	17 431.8	1 219.0	388.9	15 003.1	4 036.6	14 042.9	—
3. Official travel	9 959.3	137.7	138.5	7 997.9	2 237.6	6 625.8	—
4. Facilities and infrastructure	49 267.9	39.1	(79.0)	48 361.6	866.4	30 597.3	17 768.5
5. Ground transportation	19 201.1	33.0	(70.0)	15 144.6	4 019.5	4 702.2	1 150.7
6. Air transportation	27 550.9	—	(98.0)	15 332.6	12 120.3	37 329.7	6.9
7. Communications	23 197.0	50.9	(100.0)	20 098.6	3 049.3	10 118.1	3 267.4
8. Information technology	7 543.3	30.1	(45.2)	6 761.1	767.1	4 844.0	2 407.5
9. Medical	1 642.7	—	(20.0)	1 802.3	(179.6)	1 337.4	246.4
10. Special equipment	1 238.2	—	(50.0)	1 439.0	(250.8)	—	—
11. Other supplies, services and equipment	9 483.1	17.8	(59.2)	8 134.4	1 307.3	5 462.5	12.7
12. Quick-impact projects	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Subtotal, category III	**169 677.4**	**1 527.6**	**6.0**	**143 214.2**	**27 996.8**	**117 638.5**	**24 860.1**

	1 January 2004 to 31 December 2005					1 January to 31 December 2006	
	Appropriations	*Commitments*	*Redeployments*	*Expenditures*	*Variance*	*Total requirements*	*Non-recurrent requirements*
Category of expenditure	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5 = (1+2+3-4)*	*6*	*7*
IV. Other programmes							
1. Political programmes	105.4	—	—	99.1	6.3	44.8	—
2. Military programmes	31.8	—	—	30.0	1.8	17.1	—
3. Civilian and police programmes	80.0	—	—	75.2	4.8	62.9	—
4. Public information programmes	1 227.2	—	—	1 112.9	114.3	2 321.7	1 917.6
5. Human rights programmes	308.7	—	—	290.2	18.5	70.9	—
6. Training programmes	1 110.3	—	—	1 019.7	90.6	21.9	—
Subtotal, category IV	**2 863.4**	—	—	**2 627.1**	**236.3**	**2 539.3**	**1 917.6**
Total	**391 554.8**	**1 666.8**	—	**321 642.6**	**71 579.0**	**280 803.2**	**26 777.7**

Table 3
Staffing requirements

	Professional category and above									General Service and related categories				National staff			
	USG	*ASG*	*D-2*	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2*	***Total***	*Field Service/ security*	*Principal level*	*General Service*	***Total international***	*National Officers*	*Local level*	*UNVs*	***Grand total***
A. Continuing and new missions																	
1. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar[a]																	
Current 2005	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**1**	-	-	-	**1**	-	1	-	**2**
Proposed 2006	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**1**	-	-	-	**1**	-	1	-	**2**
2. United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau																	
Current 2005	-	-	1	-	1	4	2	1	**9**	1	-	4	**14**	-	13	-	**27**
Proposed 2006	-	-	1	-	1	4	2	1	**9**	1	-	4	**14**	1	13	-	**28**
3. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Africa[a]																	
Current 2005	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**1**	-	-	-	**1**	-	-	-	**1**
Proposed 2006	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**1**	-	-	-	**1**	-	-	-	**1**
4. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region																	
Current 2005	-	1	-	-	1	4	1	-	**7**	-	-	1	**8**	-	8	-	**16**
Proposed 2006	-	1	-	-	1	5	1	-	**8**	-	-	1	**9**	-	8	-	**17**
5. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus[a]																	
Current 2005	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	**1**	-	-	1	**2**	-	-	-	**2**
Proposed 2006	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	**2**	-	-	1	**3**	-	-	-	**3**
6. Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by Security Council resolution 1526 (2004) (previously Monitoring Group)																	
Current 2005	-	-	-	-	1	-	4	-	**5**	-	-	5	**10**	-	-	-	**10**
Proposed 2006	-	-	-	-	1	-	4	-	**5**	-	-	5	**10**	-	-	-	**10**
7. Monitoring Group on Somalia (previously Panel of Experts on Somalia)																	
Current 2005	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	**1**	-	1	-	**2**
Proposed 2006	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	**1**	-	1	-	**2**
8. Panel of Experts on Liberia																	
Current 2005	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Proposed 2006	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	**2**
9. Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo																	
Current 2005	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	**1**	-	-	-	**1**	-	-	-	**1**
Proposed 2006	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	**1**	-	-	-	**1**	-	-	-	**1**
10. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide[a]																	
Current 2005	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	**3**	-	-	1	**4**	-	-	-	**4**
Proposed 2006	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	**3**	-	-	1	**4**	-	-	-	**4**

	Professional category and above									General Service and related categories				National staff			
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Total	Field Service/ security	Principal level	General Service	Total inter-national	National Officers	Local level	UNVs	Grand total
11. Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate																	
Current 2005	-	1	1	2	9	11	3		27		1	6	34	-	-	-	34
Proposed 2006	-	1	1	2	9	11	3		27		1	8	36	-	-	-	36
12. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan																	
Current 2005	1	2	2	7	18	56	52	8	146	83	2	20	251	138	739	43	1 171
Proposed 2006	1	2	1	5	18	52	59	9	147	69	1	16	233	112	771	29	1 145
13. Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq																	
Current 2005	1	2	2	7	18	76	54	18	178	156	4	6	344	45	427	-	816
Proposed 2006	1	2	3	7	19	70	63	22	187	212	4	3	406	81	451	-	938
14. United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding																	
Current 2005	-	-	1	-	1	4	1	1	8	1		1	10	-	21	-	31
Proposed 2006	-	-	1	-	1	4	1	2	9	1		1	11	-	21	-	32
15. Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Lebanon																	
Current 2005	-	1	-	-	1	-	1	-	3	-	-	1	4	-	2	-	6
Proposed 2006	-	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	4	5	-	1	10	-	4	-	14
16. United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission																	
Current 2005	-	-	-	-	4	6	2	1	13	-	-	1	14	-	6	-	20
Proposed 2006	-	-	-	-	4	6	3	-	13	-	-	1	14	-	6	-	20
17. United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic																	
Current 2005	-	-	1	-	1	4	2	5	13	6		5	24		44	3	71
Proposed 2006	-	1	-	-	1	4	3	6	15	6		10	31		52	4	87
18. United Nations Political Office for Somalia																	
Current 2005	-	1	-	1	3	5	4	-	14	5	-	4	23	7	8	-	38
Proposed 2006	-	1	-	1	3	6	4	-	15	5	-	4	24	7	8	-	39
19. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa[b]																	
Current 2005	1	-	1	-	2	3	2	-	9	-	-	1	10	1	12	-	23
Proposed 2006	1	-	1	1	2	3	2	-	10	1	-	1	12	2	12	-	26
20. Support for the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction																	
Current 2005	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	-	1	3	-	-	-	3
Proposed 2006	-	-	-		-	-	2	-	2	-	-	1	3	-	-	-	3

	Professional category and above									General Service and related categories				National staff			
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Total	Field Service/ security	Principal level	General Service	Total international	National Officers	Local level	UNVs	Grand total
21. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara[1]																	
Current 2005	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Proposed 2006	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	**2**	-		-	**2**	-	-	-	**2**
22. United Nations Office in Timor-Leste																	
Current 2005	-	1	1	2	5	9	19	3	**40**	50	-	10	**100**	21	212	37	**370**
Proposed 2006	-	1	1	2	5	9	19	3	**40**	50		10	**100**	21	212	37	**370**
23. Panel of Experts concerning the Sudan																	
Current 2005	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	**2**	-	-	-	**2**	-	1	-	**3**
Proposed 2006	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	**2**	-		-	**2**	-	1	-	**3**
24. Panel of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire																	
Current 2005	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Proposed 2006	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-
25. United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone																	
Current 2005	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Proposed 2006	-	1	-	2	7	10	20	1	**41**	41		-	**82**	17	175	24	**298**
26. Office of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the International Advisory and Monitoring Board																	
Current 2005	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	**2**	-	-	-	**2**	-	-	-	**2**
Proposed 2006	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	**2**	-	-	-	**2**	-	-	-	**2**
B. Special political missions that have been completed or integrated with other operations																	
27. United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire																	
2004	1	-	1	3	3	17	20	-	**45**	22	-	2	**69**	14	67	7	**157**
Proposed 2006	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
28. United Nations Office in Burundi																	
2004	-	1	2	1	6	8	2	1	**21**	10	-	7	**38**	-	39	-	**77**
Proposed 2006	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
29. United Nations Advance Team in the Sudan																	
2005	1	2	3	4	15	32	36	2	**95**	72	-	4	**171**	21	227	-	**419**
Proposed 2006	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-
30. United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville																	
Current 2005	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	**2**	2	-	-	**4**	-	4	-	**8**
Proposed 2006	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

	Professional category and above									*General Service and related categories*				*National staff*			
	USG	*ASG*	*D-2*	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2*	***Total***	*Field Service/ security*	*Principal level*	*General Service*	***Total international***	*National Officers*	*Local level*	*UNVs*	***Grand total***
31. United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala																	
Current 2005	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	**2**	3	-	3	**8**	-	27	-	**35**
Proposed 2006	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
32. Central American peace process																	
Current 2005	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	**1**	-	-	1	**2**	-	-	-	**2**
Proposed 2006	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total																	
Current 2005	**7**	**14**	**16**	**27**	**91**	**246**	**210**	**40**	**651**	**411**	**7**	**86**	**1 155**	**247**	**1 859**	**90**	**3 351**
Proposed 2006	**7**	**13**	**9**	**20**	**73**	**190**	**190**	**44**	**546**	**391**	**6**	**69**	**1 012**	**241**	**1 738**	**94**	**3 085**

[a] The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar, his Special Advisers on Africa, Cyprus and the Prevention of Genocide and his Personal Envoy for Western Sahara are engaged on a when-actually-employed basis.

[b] The D-2 position of the United Nations Office for West Africa is provided by the United Nations Development Programme.

III. Action required of the General Assembly

16. The General Assembly is requested to:

(a) Approve a charge against the provision for special political missions requested in section 3, Political affairs, of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007, totalling $280,803,200, of which:

(i) $210,400 relates to the one political mission presented in table 1, part I A, above, emanating from the action taken or to be taken by the Assembly on the basis of the statement of programme budget implications submitted to it under rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the Assembly;

(ii) $280,592,800 relates to special political missions presented in table 1, part I B, above, emanating from the actions taken or to be taken by the Security Council;

(b) Note that the balance of resources remaining for special political missions in the initial provision of $355,949,300 (after recosting) amounts to $75,146,100. Any further requirements beyond this amount arising for special political missions in the course of the biennium 2006-2007 would be subject to the provisions contained in paragraph 11 of annex I of General Assembly resolution 41/213 of 19 December 1986.

Annex

Provision for special political missions, 2006-2007

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Amount appropriated for special political missions		355 949.3
Charges approved during the first part of the sixtieth session		
1. Missions emanating from decisions of the General Assembly		
Human rights questions: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives (see table 1, part I A): 1 political mission	210.4	
2. Missions emanating from decisions of the Security Council		
Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the Security Council (see table 1, part I B): 25 political missions	280 592.8	
Total charges		**280 803.2**
Balance in the provision for special political missions		**75 146.1**

United Nations A/60/586–S/2005/776

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
12 December 2005

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixtieth session
Agenda items 14 and 108

The situation in the Middle East

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Sixtieth year

Identical letters dated 9 December 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing with regard to yet another outrageous statement by the President of Iran, in which he cast doubt on the truth of the Holocaust and suggested that "the Zionists" be relocated to Europe.

On 1 November 2005, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on Holocaust remembrance (resolution 60/7), in which, among other items, it rejects "any denial of the Holocaust as an historical event, either in full or in part". Iran was included in the adoption by consensus of that resolution.

I would like to recall Iran's statement of 26 October 2005, in which it called for the eradication of Israel, another Member State. One would have thought this rhetoric belonged to a different era, yet I fear it represents something graver than simply rhetoric — it sheds light on the Government of Iran's policies and intentions vis-à-vis the State of Israel.

The statement this week further discloses the dangerous stance of this United Nations Member State against another United Nations Member State. I acknowledge with appreciation your prompt denunciation of this statement. I also recall condemnation by you, the Security Council and countless members of the international community of the President of the Iran's statement in October.

Iran's dangerous mix of Holocaust denial, direct and continuous support for terrorism, nuclear programme and ambitions, as well as its blunt incitement and confrontation against another United Nations Member State, are contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and the principles and ideals of this institution. Israel therefore urges the international community to take swift and strong action against Iran.

05-63613 (E) 121205

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda items 14 and 108, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ambassador Dan **Gillerman**
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/60/587–S/2005/778

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixtieth session
Agenda items 106 and 108

Crime prevention and criminal justice

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Sixtieth year

Letter dated 9 December 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to draw your attention to the fact that the outcome of the court trial on the cases related to the terrorist acts in Andijan was commented upon in an unfair and prejudiced manner by the States members of the European Union in their statement circulated as a Security Council document (S/2005/749).

In this connection, I would like to attach the statement of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan (see annex) so that it could contribute to the accurate and objective understanding of the issue by the international community.

I would appreciate it if you could circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda items 106 and 108, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Alisher **Vohidov**
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uzbekistan

05-63691 (E) 131205 131205

Annex to the letter dated 9 December 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]

Statement by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan

The judicial proceedings in Tashkent relating to 15 individuals accused of committing terrorist acts in May 2005 in the town of Andijan were conducted in accordance with the rules of Uzbek legislation, which itself complies with the standards and requirements of the rules of international law.

It must be noted that the rules of international law are based on the principles of the fullest protection for human rights and people's interests and are binding on the whole of the world community. Uzbekistan observes these requirements with due strictness.

These international standards were also observed in the course of the legal proceedings in Tashkent. Indeed, the trial was extremely transparent, open and, ultimately, accessible to the entire world community, in the person of representatives of diplomatic missions, international organizations and the foreign media. We note that, notwithstanding their democratic approach to the consideration of cases, the judicial practices of the United States of America and the European Union have not, to date, manifested similar or identical qualities.

In the light of these facts, the statements by officials of the United States and the European Union on the allegedly unfounded nature of the charges against 15 individuals who participated in mass disorders in Andijan are clearly rather subjective and tendentious.

With regard to the testimony which the United States and the European Union described as implausible and obtained under duress, the actual facts admit of no doubt as to its objectivity and trustworthiness. The testimony by witnesses and victims concerning the events in question was fully confirmed by the evidence on the case that emerged in the course of investigations. It may be noted that United States and European Union representatives were themselves eyewitnesses to the judicial proceedings when they listened to the testimony of some 300 people. They also witnessed the adversarial approach adopted by the defence, which included the counsel whose defence procedures were branded "inadequate". The undoubted effectiveness of the defence is irrefutably shown by the fact that a number of counts were excluded from the indictment, which had a considerable effect on the final form of the penalties imposed.

It only remains to note that such "extreme concern" expressed about Uzbekistan by Western countries which have also in their time been fated to suffer from terrorist acts is somewhat bewildering and raises some doubts as to the sincerity of their concern. The statements by the United States and the European Union give Uzbekistan, in its turn, cause to express some concern as to whether they are truly committed to combating terrorism. For their actions run completely counter to the principles of the fight against terrorism that they themselves have been advancing and proclaiming.

United Nations A/60/588

General Assembly

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Sixtieth session
Agenda items 32, 132 and 136

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the review of military involvement in civil assistance in peacekeeping operations

Summary

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) observed that in general the military components of peacekeeping operations earnestly assist humanitarian organizations and agencies when such support is requested. Furthermore, most contingents that carry out community support projects are not only focused on pragmatically building good relationships with the local population or generating positive publicity but are genuinely committed to improving the living conditions of and making a positive contribution to their host communities. However, OIOS found that the quality and effectiveness of those activities varied greatly and, in some instances, led to unintended consequences that hampered support for humanitarian organizations and agencies and confidence-building with the local population.

To address the current shortcomings, effective military involvement in civil assistance should begin with coherent planning and strategy development. The provision of support to humanitarian activities requires early coordinated planning to ensure that adequate resources and coordination capacity are available to carry out effective support tasks, such as infrastructure work. Support for local communities should be based on a clear strategy and an understanding of the needs of the affected population in order to achieve mission objectives and complement other civil activities in an area of operations. Therefore, thorough consultation and coordination with humanitarian organizations and agencies is necessary to identify the highest impact projects based on the needs of the local population and to avoid duplication

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and irrelevant or conflicting activities. In particular, existing coordination and liaison functions, such as the civil-military coordination positions staffed by military and civilian personnel in peacekeeping operations, need to be strengthened and better aligned. Furthermore, the development, revision, distribution and follow-up of relevant policies are needed to ensure that the military component has a clear understanding of what proper military involvement in civil assistance entails and how the military can make a positive contribution to the affected population and support the mission as a whole. Adequate resources and personnel qualified to provide support to humanitarian activities or local communities are needed to make military involvement more effective. OIOS has made 12 recommendations to address the issues discussed in the present report. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has agreed to all the recommendations and has already started to implement some of them.

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I. Introduction

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) reviewed military involvement in civil assistance (MICA) in United Nations peacekeeping operations with specific focus on the support to humanitarian activities and community support projects (CSPs) conducted by the military components of peacekeeping operations.[1] Along with its primary task of provision of security, MICA became a common activity of the military component in all missions owing to realities on the ground in recent conflicts, which have led to the broadening of contemporary peacekeeping mandates in the context of multidimensional peace operations and national and multinational (non-United Nations) military doctrines that encourage the military to support local communities in an area of operations. Increased MICA put on the agenda issues regarding the coordination of such assistance with overall mission objectives and the enhancement of its effectiveness and efficiency, which the present report addresses in four subject areas. The findings and recommendations of OIOS are based on surveys of humanitarian and military personnel in the field, analyses of existing research, policies and relevant oversight studies, and extensive interviews conducted in New York and in the field.[2]

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2. Notwithstanding the ongoing discussions on "humanitarian space" and the challenges of integrated missions, the primary interest of OIOS was in pragmatic and practical ways and means to foster a positive impact of MICA within the peacekeeping framework and resources. OIOS structured its analysis of MICA along two major activities: (a) military support to humanitarian organizations and agencies (HOAs); and (b) CSPs executed by the military. The two areas of MICA differ in that the support for humanitarian activities is provided on request from HOAs, whereas CSPs are generally initiated and carried out by the military component itself. OIOS noted the insistence of HOAs that CSPs should not be confused with or characterized as humanitarian activities. In order for HOAs to maintain their freedom of movement, operational ability and the confidence of their beneficiaries, they must be perceived as independent from the armed forces, particularly if the latter become militarily engaged with belligerents either in self-defence or under a Chapter VII mandate. Cognizant of this concern and of the fact that the term "humanitarian" is based on a well-defined set of internationally accepted criteria, OIOS will maintain this dichotomy throughout the report. OIOS believes it is equally important that mission military contingents are aware of and observe this distinction.

3. The comments of management were sought on the draft report and taken into account. Where appropriate, they are set out in italics in the body of the report.

[1] For purposes of the present report, MICA did not include activities related to civil and political affairs, human rights, demining, child protection or disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

[2] In-depth interviews with focus groups, document analyses and site visits were conducted in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). Additional interviews and document analyses were undertaken in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The review was conducted between April and November 2005.

OIOS greatly appreciates the cooperation extended to it by the military and civilian management and staff in the field and in New York during the review.

II. Findings

4. With regard to the first category of MICA, OIOS noted that the most frequent request from HOAs for military support was for information pertaining to security conditions on the ground. Next, and equally important, were requests for escorts and logistics, followed by infrastructure support and direct support in distributing relief assistance. Such requests are usually made in exceptional circumstances and as a last resort when either the security situation so dictates or the resources of HOAs are insufficient to meet a critical need.

5. Security information is the most sought after and common form of support to HOAs because the military component is uniquely positioned and equipped to gather, synthesize and analyse security and other pertinent information on conditions prevailing on the ground. OIOS observed, however, that the extent and usefulness of information given to HOAs varied greatly, and that in certain missions HOAs were dissatisfied with its reliability and content. The level of satisfaction was higher regarding the response by military components to requests from HOAs for escorts and logistic support, with some exceptions, including instances where HOA guidelines were not followed. OIOS noted that assets such as air transport or engineering are not necessarily under the control of the military component and could be under mission authority, and that the support for HOAs with those assets varied widely across missions. OIOS observed that in some instances, requests from HOAs could not be fulfilled for reasons such as priority access and unresolved cost recovery arrangements.

6. With regard to the second category of MICA, the most common projects implemented by contingents in direct support of local communities were medical assistance (in at least 10 missions), followed by the distribution of food and water (9 missions), clothing and supplies (8 missions) and transportation of the local population (8 missions). The organization of cultural or educational events (in 6 missions) was last on the list. For example, one Mission reported during a given month that it had provided medical treatment to about 600 local civilians, distributed food to 115 local families, worked with a local community to repair a water pump, worked with international organizations to repair roads and conducted nine sports and recreational activities. Those activities by the military component were intended to support local communities in order to foster good relationships and consequently to minimize the risk of hostile acts. They also facilitated better understanding by the military of the local security environment and increased opportunities to receive relevant information.

7. While CSPs are funded mostly through provisions from troop-contributing countries to their respective contingents, resources are in some instances also sought by contingents through funding for quick-impact projects. Quick-impact projects account for a small percentage of a mission's budget, and in some cases, proceeds from a separate trust fund are used to conduct small-scale projects (usually $25,000 maximum per project) to improve the quality of life of the local population and help establish the credibility of a new mission. Quick-impact projects, which are vetted in a review process managed by each mission, have enabled them to finance projects

such as the rehabilitation of educational and health facilities, the improvement of sanitation and infrastructure, and the provision of technical training. In 2005, there were 475 quick-impact projects in nine missions, with about $600,000 to $1 million available in each mission from the assessed budgets.

8. CSPs received positive feedback from HOAs when the military component used its comparative advantages, such as the capability to use engineering equipment for infrastructure and reconstruction projects or medical expertise and facilities, as well as when it engaged with the community through cultural and sports events. However, OIOS noted that in some instances other CSPs had been criticized by HOAs for their unforeseen, misguided, controversial or, at times, negative impact, especially in missions under a Chapter VII mandate.

A. Strategy and planning

9. As described above, military components contribute to achieving mission mandates, such as facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance by responding to requests from HOAs (e.g., providing escorts and logistic support) and through information sharing and other coordinated activities. The provision of such support requires that the mission have both an effective civil-military coordination and liaison function dealing with requests from HOAs and the capability to provide military escorts and logistic and engineering support.

10. OIOS noted, however, that such support from the military component is often not mentioned in relevant planning documents and preparatory mission reports, and consequently is not included in corresponding budget requests. Therefore, such support tasks are not factored into the budget allocated for the primary mandate of the military component — the provision of security. Consequently, in cases where the military is fully engaged in implementing its core mandate, it cannot provide adequate support to humanitarian activities. OIOS observed that the integrated mission planning processes and types of integrated mission task forces, such as working groups aimed at bringing partners outside the Department of Peacekeeping Operations into the planning of missions, so far have not incorporated the planning of military components' support for humanitarian activities. OIOS is of the view that recent efforts by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to review the mission planning process could benefit from including HOAs in the discussions to ensure that their perspective is considered when planning for the military component of future missions.

11. At the same time, HOAs do not always engage proactively with the Department during mission planning or in regular mandate reviews. As a result, such exercises lack information needed to determine how the operations of HOAs could benefit from military support in different areas. One factor hampering more harmonized planning is that key HOAs, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Programme and the World Health Organization, develop plans and strategies within their headquarters and in regional/country offices, while planning for peacekeeping operations is done by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York or in the missions themselves.

12. OIOS observed weaknesses in strategy at the mission level for civil-military coordination and liaison in general, and concerning CSPs implemented by the contingents in particular. CSPs were almost always planned at the contingent level

instead of being built into an overall strategy in support of the mission objective with an identified target population, place and plan. The lack of strategic alignment of CSPs with mission objectives was especially apparent when the contingent approach to CSPs was supply driven and correlated with neither the essential needs of the local population nor the overall humanitarian and development effort in an area. The underlying reasons were that at times CSPs had been based on what contingents had available rather than on the priority needs of the population on the ground. Finally, attempts to strategically plan for CSPs were complicated by late deployments of the relevant staff officers to missions, which excluded them from the initial phase of in-mission planning.

B. Coordination

13. The main military entity responsible for coordinating MICA is the civil-military coordination and liaison function at force headquarters. This function may exist either as a branch within force headquarters or as a unit within the Operations Branch. Staff officers responsible for civil-military coordination and liaison at force headquarters are primarily tasked with advising the Force Commander on civil-military issues and operations and participating in coordination mechanisms. This function is mirrored at sector headquarters, which also transmits information from contingents to force headquarters. At the contingent level, designated officers for civil-military coordination, if appointed, coordinate with civilian entities and the sector headquarters and facilitate the execution of CSPs.

14. OIOS noted that coordination between force headquarters, sector headquarters and contingents does not consistently occur with regard to CSPs. Although staff officers for civil-military coordination and liaison are expected to supervise and participate in the planning of CSPs, they are, in the vast majority of cases, kept informed only after a project has been completed. Therefore, opportunities to coordinate and promote such projects within overall mission efforts and to improve project implementation were not consistently utilized.

15. United Nations military observers often provide good suggestions for CSPs and quick-impact projects due to their proximity to local communities. However, different reporting lines are not conducive to the consistent communication of such information to the civil-military coordination function in either sector or force headquarters. Although OIOS recognizes that different reporting lines are unavoidable, and even necessary when individual units function independently, and acknowledges the efforts of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to integrate reporting by the military at the force headquarters level, this has yet to be achieved in all missions.

16. Besides the necessity for close coordination within the military component, proper coordination and liaison with the humanitarian community through the humanitarian coordinator or his/her representative would help contingents to concentrate on projects with the highest impact, to address the needs of the target population and, most of all, to harmonize their initiatives with the overall humanitarian and rehabilitation activities in an area. However, such coordination rarely occurs with regard to CSPs. Lack of coordination may lead to grave consequences, as pointed out by HOAs, especially when contingents provide direct assistance to the local population in situations of peace enforcement and combat, in

that other parties to the conflict and the beneficiaries may be neither willing nor able to differentiate between assistance provided by the military and that provided by humanitarian agencies.[3] This very serious concern makes close consultation between the military component and HOAs essential to ensure that lives are not endangered and that access to the affected population remains open. Nevertheless, OIOS observed that CSPs are generally approved by contingent commanders, sometimes in consultation with the Force Commander, but rarely in consultation with the humanitarian coordinator or his/her representative, even though such projects may have a serious impact on humanitarian activities. OIOS acknowledges recent initiatives to revise the guidelines on the relations between representatives of the Secretary-General, resident coordinators and humanitarian coordinators and the Department's civil-military coordination policy to address the issue of effective coordination for "hearts and minds" activities (i.e., CSPs) and quick-impact projects and expects that dissemination of those instructions to all levels of command will establish a functional and clear coordination mechanism. In that connection, OIOS would like to emphasize that those instructions should allow for a realistic degree of flexibility for national contingents concerning CSPs.

17. OIOS noted the efforts by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to improve coordination through the deployment of civilian staff to function as civil-military coordination officers. There are currently three such officers deployed in the context of missions, two by the Department and one by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, working with slightly different terms of reference. However, their roles are not well understood, and there is often a lack of consensus between the military and civilian components and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs regarding their terms of reference and responsibilities. In one such case, the main reason for confusion was that the civil-military coordination function, staffed with a civil-military coordinator officer, had been initially established by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs with a focus on advising the humanitarian coordinator, while the incoming mission had set up a similar coordination and liaison function using the same terms of reference, effectively creating a duplicate position. Subsequently, the coordination function of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs disappeared, and while keeping the same title, the officer was now advising not only the humanitarian coordinator but also the military component. Consequently, conflicts about specific responsibilities and areas of authority arose with the staff officers of the military component. Confusion was compounded by the use of the same titles for those functions currently carried out by civilian and military personnel. In order to avoid the duplication of efforts, OIOS is of the view that whenever a civil-military coordination function is already in place before the establishment of a mission, close consultation between the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is required to determine the appropriate location and responsibilities of the relevant personnel in the new context and to ensure that there is no conflict in terms of reference, job descriptions, or titles or the relationships between military and civilian personnel responsible for civil-military coordination within and outside the mission.

[3] See Inter-Agency Standing Committee reference paper on civil-military relationships in complex emergencies, June 2004, para. 43.

18. While the civil-military coordination officer primarily serves the HOAs, in particular by providing support to the humanitarian coordinator, OIOS observed that there is a need for ongoing professional advice to missions, especially the military component, on the implementation of CSPs and on the interaction and coordination between the military component and HOAs. Within the current structure, neither the civilian civil-military coordination officer nor the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator has the authority to make decisions or instruct and advise the military component, which, in some instances, has not welcomed such advice, particularly on CSPs. Although initiatives by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, in conjunction with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, to provide briefings to incoming Force Commanders and Heads of Mission during their induction are certainly very useful and may address some crucial issues regarding CSPs and quick-impact projects, those are one-time events that occur before the immediate need arises for advice in a specific situation. In addition, while staff officers with experience in civil-military coordination or exposure to relevant training courses may be well equipped to offer advice on military aspects of civil-military coordination, the effectiveness of CSPs implemented by the military component would benefit from complementary input from professionals with experience in humanitarian affairs, rehabilitation and development. Additionally, the lack of civilian personnel within the civil-military coordination branch at force headquarters may hamper coordination efforts, given the differences between military and civilian culture and the need to engage with the complicated network of civilian actors conducting humanitarian activities. OIOS therefore believes that a joint civil-military coordination unit in the mission headquarters could effectively address the current shortcomings in coordination and ensure that CSPs are in line with the overall humanitarian programme and advance mission objectives.

19. With regard to the coordination of requests for support from HOAs to the military component, OIOS noted that because of confusion on the part of HOAs over where and how to request mission assistance, such requests were communicated through a number of different channels, sometimes directly to contingent commanders. As a result, at times the military received unfiltered and unprioritized requests without having had the capacity to evaluate their relative importance. OIOS also observed that some HOAs had unrealistic expectations about the support to be expected from missions, especially with regard to movement of personnel and cargo requests. The approval processes for such requests, lacking full transparency, were not helpful either. All this indicates to OIOS that to make coordination mechanisms reliable, it is essential to have well-known points of contact and clear authorization channels and procedures for dealing with requests for support. It is equally important for all such information to be readily available and well publicized and for the established arrangements to be consistently followed.

C. Policy guidance

20. The civil-military coordination policy of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was formulated in 2002 as binding for all missions. It outlined relevant principles and staffing and training requirements. The policy is currently being updated in collaboration with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

Affairs. OIOS observed that because of deficient distribution and enforcement of the 2002 policy, it is unknown to contingent commanders and at force headquarters. Other guiding documents prepared by the Department, such as Force Commander directives, refer only briefly to the civil-military coordination policy and matters relevant to MICA. Consequently, the national and multinational (non-United Nations) military policies that are followed by contingents in some missions do not necessarily agree with the Department's policy and vary significantly from each other, while in other instances there is no policy at all in place. The failure to apply an existing policy to missions has created a lack of conceptual consensus and led to misconceptions about MICA and the civil-military coordination function. There are also guidance documents prepared by HOAs, aimed primarily at the humanitarian community, that address the issue of military support for humanitarian activities, but they are not easily usable by the peacekeeping force and not binding for missions. Although beyond the immediate scope of this review, there is an additional need to provide peacekeeping forces with a comprehensive civil-military coordination policy (or a compendium of mutually coherent policies) covering various types of interactions between civilians and the military in multidimensional peacekeeping operations, such as human rights, civil affairs, political affairs and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, that need to address a set of issues different from those relating only to humanitarian activities in their narrow sense.

21. Within a proper guidance system, a central policy prepared at Headquarters that outlines the Department's position on, objectives for, and/or approach to important issues or activities in United Nations peacekeeping operations should be translated into specific standard operating procedures or similar documents that provide actionable instructions for those implementing tasks at different levels of command. However, with few exceptions, OIOS was not made aware of such instructions aimed at the tactical level relevant to MICA. Other guidance material originating at the mission level, such as that on concepts of operations and military campaign plans, did not specify how contingents should approach crucial activities in implementing MICA-related tasks but only provided a broader framework for the military component. OIOS believes that it is necessary to translate the revised version of the Department's civil-military coordination policy into standard operating procedures for different levels of military command and national contingents in order to provide guidance on how to implement MICA. There is a need for such standard operating procedures to provide clear instructions on: (a) how to interact with HOAs during their operations in an emergency/crisis situation or while conducting CSPs; (b) how to conduct CSPs (e.g., developing strategy, identifying appropriate projects, prioritizing, planning, executing, evaluating and publicizing); (c) when coordination is required and with whom (such as HOAs, local communities and authorities); (d) the type of information that should be shared with whom and how; (e) what donations are appropriate and the funding mechanisms for such projects (regarding financial ceilings, acceptable items and the identification of distribution mechanisms); and (f) discouragement of the military component's use of the term "humanitarian" to describe CSPs. Currently, the mission-level guidance material is often developed after significant delays, and the nomenclature used in such guidance documents is inconsistent. OIOS acknowledges the current efforts of the Department to update and improve its guidance system and believes that the correction of those shortcomings should be part of it.

22. OIOS noted the existence of a number of guidelines on quick-impact projects and acknowledges recent efforts by the Department and peacekeeping operations to review the guidelines and address previous OIOS recommendations, especially with regard to the duration of the implementation of quick-impact projects and their evaluation. However, OIOS observed that contingents were at times not aware of what types of projects to submit and that they frequently had difficulty in administering them. In some instances, knowledge about the availability of funding for quick-impact projects was inconsistent throughout missions, the military and civilian components were confused about their roles and responsibilities in managing quick-impact projects, and the selection of projects often did not follow a clear strategy or take target beneficiaries into consideration. Such confusion is caused primarily by the nature of current guidelines available to missions that outline procedures on how to set up approval committees and processes for quick-impact projects and a list of possible intervention areas, but that lack instructions relating to the more programmatic aspects of quick-impact projects, such as (a) the need for a mission-specific strategy and corresponding selection criteria; (b) the proper implementation and management of projects according to phases and responsibilities; (c) ways to promote quick-impact projects within and outside the mission; and (d) the necessity to evaluate projects and record and disseminate lessons learned.

D. Support and resources

23. The Department's capacity to provide advice and support to missions on MICA is very limited. Although liaison officers in the Military Division are extremely dedicated to the issue, they are covering a range of other activities and their job descriptions do not include support for peacekeeping operations on MICA or civil-military coordination. OIOS observed that mission staff did not always know where in the Department to seek advice on MICA. At the same time, OIOS noted that the Civil-military Coordination Section and Policy Development and Studies Branch of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs play important roles by providing advice about civil-military coordination to mission staff, especially for those who have participated in civil-military coordination training and built informal networks to share experiences and advice. The Civil-military Coordination Section and its network of former trainees (including those who completed training programmes offered by other institutions, such as the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes) could be further developed with the support of the Department into an established resource for the provision of continuous advice to civilian and military staff deployed in missions regarding the humanitarian dimension of MICA. For this to succeed, close interaction between the Civil-military Coordination Section, and the Policy Development and Studies Branch and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on the issue of MICA is essential. It is equally important that chiefs of the civil-military coordination branches at force headquarters complete the civil-military coordination training as required by the revised policy of the Department.

24. At the mission level, OIOS noted that a shortage of qualified personnel is making it difficult to effectively manage MICA. In some instances, contingents were deployed without a civil-military coordination officer. Instead, personnel were often assigned to that function on an ad hoc basis, with that role being assumed in

addition to their existing responsibilities. In some instances, OIOS found that staff officers at force headquarters and officers at the contingent level lacked the proper qualifications for civil-military coordination because the Department's mission force headquarters job descriptions for civil-military coordination, troop-contributing country guidelines or the relevant generic memorandums of understanding did not require prior experience in civil-military coordination. Furthermore, relevant training requirements that would compensate to a certain degree for the lack of experience are also not reflected in the above-mentioned documents. In addition, staff officers and contingent-level officers often have not been provided with a sufficient number of vehicles, communications devices, digital cameras, business cards and other essentials to be fully effective in civil-military coordination.

Training material

25. Together with HOAs, the Department's Integrated Training Service developed a basic pre-deployment training content for United Nations peacekeepers on civil-military coordination and humanitarian assistance. Although the training material is highly instructive and provides a description of how the military component can support humanitarian activities, it requires updating and does not sufficiently clarify the role of the military component in conducting CSPs and quick-impact projects. More detail on such projects is provided, for example, in the draft standard training module level 2, module 6, which targets staff officers. However, contingent or unit-level officers are usually not exposed to the standard training module level 2, although they should be provided with the same material covered in it since it is relevant for the proper implementation of CSPs. Finally, a clear understanding by senior military personnel of United Nations policy on civil-military coordination is essential. While the draft mission senior leaders course includes a module on humanitarian affairs that briefly addresses the topic of civil-military coordination as one of seven areas, it does not dedicate adequate detail to explain sufficiently the Department's civil-military coordination policy and the role of the military component in conducting CSPs, especially since they are not covered in the military operations module. Furthermore, additional modules on civil-military coordination, CSPs and quick-impact projects would make it possible to address civil-military coordination issues that go beyond the humanitarian dimension and allow for the inclusion of relevant exercises.

26. At the mission level, the force headquarters provides standardized induction courses for contingents and staff officers that include civil-military coordination. However, in-mission training for the military component was in most cases conducted only by military officers, whereas instruction from experienced civilians would have been beneficial for the trainees. Furthermore, most of the training material reviewed by OIOS was not delivered to the designated participants in a timely fashion, was more descriptive than instructive, did not cover key required skills and knowledge (for example, in project management and administration of quick-impact projects), and varied significantly from mission to mission. Finally, OIOS noted that opportunities for exchanges of knowledge and experience and lessons learned in civil-military coordination within and between contingents were very limited, although such interaction would be a valuable addition to the more institutionalized training curriculum. This applied in particular to the implementation of CSPs, where a lack of consistent transfer of knowledge between

rotating contingents about projects at times caused difficulty in ensuring continuity and timeliness of project implementation.

Lessons learned and best practices

27. OIOS noted the valuable lessons-learned studies prepared in missions on civil-military coordination and quick-impact projects and the development of an informal network among various mission coordinators of quick-impact projects who exchange information and best practices horizontally. However, OIOS was only provided with such studies prepared in UNMEE, and they were rarely known in other missions. Although the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations made an effort to improve the availability of such studies, specific categories on civil-military coordination or quick-impact projects do not exist on its website, and the relevant lessons-learned documents were not included under either the humanitarian or military categories. OIOS observed that the existing documents were neither further synthesized to make them universally applicable nor utilized to identify current gaps or opportunities for policy refinements. Furthermore, OIOS found that the results of CSPs and quick-impact projects were not reviewed systematically with sound evaluation methodologies at the mission level by either the military or civilian components. The evaluation of such projects should have included an assessment of whether quick-impact projects and other community support efforts were the most appropriate means to win the confidence of the population with the resources available. Finally, informally developed networks on quick-impact projects that facilitate the sharing of best practices did not seem to have adequate institutional support, such as the provision of space and a moderator on the peacekeeping best practices website for posting questions and answers and relevant insights directly accessible to mission personnel.

III. Conclusion

28. In most instances, the military components of peacekeeping operations earnestly support humanitarian activities and HOAs when their assistance is requested, and most contingents are committed to improving the living conditions of and making a positive contribution to their host communities. However, compassion and enthusiasm are not enough to ensure the effective and efficient outcomes of MICA. Without a coherent and comprehensive approach to planning and strategy, coordination, guidance and support, continued improvisation will hamper the capacity of military components to provide support to humanitarian activities and local communities. Since the CSPs implemented by contingents constitute an integral part of military operations, the challenge is to channel their commitment, vigour and resources in a direction that leads to a contribution to the larger mission objective and complements efforts by other actors. The current weaknesses in guidance to contingents on CSPs in missions, combined with instances of disappointing feedback, especially from HOAs, regarding the efforts of military components to support local communities need to be addressed in order to maximize the benefits of cooperation and synergy in the field. Considering the recent increase in productive discussions about integrated missions and civil-military coordination in missions, especially between the Department and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OIOS is confident that the results of those discussions will

be translated into clear instructions for military components in the near future. The next challenge will be to build on the experience gained with military components providing support to humanitarian activities and to pursue appropriate changes that address military involvement in civil-assistance throughout the stages of a peacebuilding operation beyond the humanitarian emergency phase. Such efforts will equally require a comprehensive approach that takes into account implications for planning, strategy, coordination, guidance and support.

IV. Recommendations[4]

29. The Department responded that it *agrees and supports each recommendation. It is already taking steps to implement some of those recommendations, which are quite practical and could form a support basis for some of the Department's policy initiatives.*

Recommendation 1

30. The Department should ensure that at the appropriate stages of mission planning, including assessment missions and mandate review processes, opportunities for the military component to support humanitarian organizations and agencies are identified and considered in consultation with relevant partners (paras. 10 and 11 above) (SP-05-002-001).

Recommendation 2

31. The Department should ensure that appropriate mission-level planning documents include a strategy for community support projects that takes into account the needs of the population on the ground and overall mission objectives. Such a strategy should be prepared in consultation with humanitarian organizations and agencies (para. 12) (SP-05-002-002).

Recommendation 3

32. The Department should provide missions with clear guidance on effective coordination concerning community support projects and quick-impact projects both within the military component and between the military component and humanitarian organizations and agencies (paras. 14-16) (SP-05-002-003).

Recommendation 4

33. The Department, jointly with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, should review the terms of reference and structural location of civilian officers responsible for civil-military coordination in missions with a view to enhancing their effectiveness and avoiding duplication (paras. 17 and 18) (SP-05-002-004).

[4] The symbols in parentheses in this section refer to an internal code used by OIOS for recording recommendations.

Recommendation 5

34. Peacekeeping operations should inform humanitarian organizations and agencies in the mission area that their requests for military support should be submitted to a specific point of contact, such as the joint civil-military coordination unit, who should be tasked with prioritizing such requests from a humanitarian perspective and forwarding them to the military component for action through the proper channels. When necessary, such submission points could be established for different levels of command or for different areas within the mission. The Department should ensure that such arrangements are implemented in all missions (para. 19) (SP-05-002-005).

Recommendation 6

35. The Department should promulgate its revised policy on civil-military coordination by directive from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and ensure that it is fully reflected in all other relevant guidance material, including troop-contributing country guidelines and Force Commander directives. The policy should be widely available in print and electronic versions and serve as the basis for the preparation of a generic standard operating procedure, aimed at different levels of command to cover interaction between humanitarian organizations and agencies and the military in the field and the implementation of community support projects (paras. 20 and 21) (SP-05-002-006).

Recommendation 7

36. The Department should complement the current terms of reference for quick-impact projects issued by the Controller with additional instructions on the preparation of mission-specific strategies and on the management, implementation and evaluation of quick-impact projects (para. 22) (SP-05-002-007).

Recommendation 8

37. In consultation with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Department should advise missions about their point of contact for advice on military involvement in civil-assistance (para. 23) (SP-05-002-008).

Recommendation 9

38. The Department should ensure that an adequate number of qualified personnel and a sufficient amount of support equipment (such as vehicles and other supplies) are provided to missions for an effective civil-military coordination function at force and sector headquarters and at the contingent level. In particular, the Department should include, at a minimum, a provision for prior training in civil-military coordination in the "qualifications required" section of updated mission force headquarters job descriptions and similarly amend the troop-contributing country guidelines and the "Capabilities" section of the personnel annex to generic memorandums of understanding to reflect qualification requirements for relevant military personnel as set out in its civil-military coordination policy (para. 24) (SP-05-002-009).

Recommendation 10

39. The Department should update the generic training module on civil-military coordination contained in the standard generic training module level 1 to include more detail on the role of the military component in implementing community support projects and quick-impact projects. Furthermore, the standard training module level 3 should contain separate modules on civil-military coordination, including community support projects and quick-impact projects (para. 25) (SP-05-002-010).

Recommendation 11

40. The Department should include in the job description of the chief civil-military coordination staff officer the responsibility for ensuring that in-mission training covering civil-military coordination is provided to relevant military personnel, including United Nations military observers, upon arrival in theatre, and that the standard training module 2-6 and the relevant material from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on civil-military coordination training are consistently used as a blueprint for such training. The job description should also include the responsibility to hold regular meetings and promote the exchange of information, including through the Intranet, between contingents, on civil-military coordination issues, and to ensure effective transfer of knowledge on military involvement in civil assistance between rotating contingents and within the force (para. 26) (SP-05-002-011).

Recommendation 12

41. The Department should institute a mechanism and designate responsibilities for recording, distilling and analysing lessons learned and best practices related to military involvement in civil assistance, including community support projects, and quick-impact projects, and distribute relevant studies, for example, through its website, an interactive database or a virtual community of practice (para. 27) (SP5-02-012).

(*Signed*) Inga-Britt **Ahlenius**
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